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Executive Summary 
Economic espionage is a serious threat to the vitality of the U.S. economy. While this is a widely 
accepted fact, there is no formal way to measure the damage an incident of economic espionage 
has on the U.S. economy. The U.S. government would like to know how damaging economic 
espionage is on the economy. However, the full repercussions of an incident of economic 
espionage are never known. A stolen trade secret, over the course of many years, could be used 
in different products and in different industries. The loss of a trade secret is an immeasurable 
value.   
 
Instead of attempting to measure such an overarching elusive concept, the research team sought 
to measure the potential consequence of economic espionage. In this study, the research team 
constructed a model to identify the severity of an incident of economic espionage and its 
consequences on the U.S. economy. The model was designed for use by federal government 
employees with the intent that the federal government could apply publically available case 
information to the model. The model provides a qualitative estimate of “consequence” as it 
relates to economic loss. 
 
The model generates a severity score between 0 and 1, which corresponds to a „low‟, „moderate‟, 
and „high‟ consequence. The severity score incorporates the model‟s four main variables into 
two primary components: „Industry‟ and „Case Variables‟.  
 
„Industry‟ assesses the significance of where the incident of economic espionage occurred. 
„Industry‟ is derived from a combination of the percentage of GDP in terms of value added for 
each of the 14 industries and the „susceptibility‟ of each of the 14 industries. This process 
enables the model to be individualized to a specific industry, which allows a different potential 
consequence to the U.S. economy.  
 
„Case Variables‟ assess the significance of the incident of economic espionage. „Case Variables‟ 
include the „Characteristics of the Theft‟, „Cost‟, and „Beneficiary‟ variables. The model requires 
the user to first select the „Industry‟ where the incident occurred and then to identify the „Case 
Variables‟. Therefore, the potential consequence on the U.S. economy from an incident of 
economic espionage is dependent on the industry.  
 
To greater individualize the model, the research team designed a method whereby questions 
within the model would matter more when compared to others. As no two incidents of economic 
espionage are identical, the research team developed a system of weighing the variables and their 
respective questions. With all the variables measured, standardized, and weighed against each 
other, the model calculates an overall severity score, which corresponds to the level of 
consequence for an incident of economic espionage.  
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Introduction 
The objective of this research study is to develop a method to measure the consequence of 
economic espionage on the U.S. economy. As defined by the 1996 Economic Espionage Act, 
economic espionage is the misappropriation of trade secrets (including conspiracy to 
misappropriate) with the knowledge or intent that the theft will benefit a entity, specifically a 
foreign government, instrumentality, or agent. 
 
In addition to economic espionage, there are other ways in which foreign entities can benefit 
from U.S. ingenuity, such as industrial espionage and reverse engineering. This study does not 
measure the consequence of these other means, only the theft or intended theft of trade secrets 
that benefit or intend to benefit a foreign entity.  A trade secret is any form of information in 
which its value is derived from the information remaining secret.  
 
This study will investigate cases filed under the Economic Espionage Act to determine their 
consequence on the U.S. economy.  The results will measure the consequence of economic 
espionage on an ordinal scale.  For the purposes of this study, consequence is defined as the 
impact or potential impact an individual incident of economic espionage has or can have on the 
U.S. economy, in terms of competitiveness and potential impact to GDP. The model calculates 
consequence and defines it as „Low,‟ „Moderate,‟ or „High.‟ 
 
The study resulted in the development of a user model for the federal government. The purpose 
of the user model is to measure the level of consequence each incident of economic espionage 
has on the U.S. economy. The user model generates a value on an ordinal scale with a 
corresponding level of consequence.   
 
The study hypothesizes that there is a dynamic relationship between the industry, characteristics 
of the theft, cost, and beneficiary that influences the level of consequence an incident of 
economic espionage has on the U.S. economy. The study defines the consequence of economic 
espionage on the U.S. economy as its dependent variable. Furthermore, the study defines the 
relationship between industry, characteristics of the theft, cost, and beneficiary as the 
independent variables.  It is important to note that many incidents of economic espionage lack 
perfect information. Therefore, the study incorporates imperfect information into its assessment, 
and the model was designed to adjust for incidents of imperfect information. Due to the lack of 
information on the topic of economic espionage, specifically means to measure consequence, this 
study recommends future research that evaluates the causes and effects of incidents of economic 
espionage on the U.S. economy.   
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Literature Review 
Overview: 
The purpose of this literature review is to provide an overview of the current body of literature 
on economic espionage and related studies. An examination of existing literature reveals 
limitations on available information, specifically methods to measure the consequence of 
economic espionage. Given the available literature, the topic of economic espionage can be 
divided into two distinct categories.  The first section will provide an overview of literature on 
estimated loss. The second section will examine methodologies that attempt to measure the 
consequence of economic espionage. 
 
Literature on Estimated Loss 
Formal studies measuring the costs of cyber crime share methodological similarities with 
attempts to measure the consequence of economic espionage.  Although reports often cite wide-
ranging figures for dollars lost, researchers are hesitant to release their methodologies and 
sources of data. For example, a 2004 report on the costs of cyber-crime by the Congressional 
Research Service assessed that the worldwide cost of computer attacks in 2003 ranged from $13 
billion to over $226 billion.
1
 Likewise, the report noted that shareholder losses in stock prices on 
the New York Stock Exchange ranged from $50 to $200 billion following the announcement of a 
cyber-attack.
2
  
 
Many reports, such as the Congressional Research Service‟s 2004 study on cyber attacks, 
attempt to quantitatively measure the damage. However, they do not explain the methodology 
behind the scale. Additionally, while reports, such as the Department of Justice‟s “Cybercrime 
against Businesses” and Defense Security Service‟s “Technical Collection Trends,” reference 
survey respondents from companies and theft reports as their primary source of data,
 3,4
 but 
maintain the anonymity of the survey respondents and their affiliated companies. Therefore, it is 
difficult to apply the available data to subsequent research methodologies because current reports 
do not establish a relationship between the type of survey response and the type of company. 
 
A separate report by the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) estimated U.S. 
companies lost over $300 billion in 1997 due to espionage targeting proprietary information.
5
 
Similarly, the White House Office of Science and Technology estimated that economic 
espionage cost U.S. businesses about $100 billion in 1996.
6
 However, no information is provided 
on how this figure was estimated. 
 
Although these reports represent a relatively small cross-section of the literature, they often lack 
sufficient information on the process, variables, and data used to estimate cost.   
  
                                               
1 U.S. Congressional Research Service. “The Economic Impact of Cyber-Attacks,” (RL32331; April 1, 2004) Brian Cashell, et al. 
2 Ibid 
3 Ramona R. Rantala. “Cybercrime Against Businesses 2005.” Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, U.S. Department of 
Justice. (2008). 
4 Sara Dewitz, Joseph O‟Brien, Timothy Deerr, John Parsons, and Erika Souliere. “Targeting U.S. Technologies: A Trend 
Analysis of Reporting from Defense Industry.” Defense Security Service. (2008).  
5 F.W. Rustmann Jr. CIA, Inc. Espionage and the Craft of Business Intelligence. Potomac Books Inc., 2002, p. 121.    
6 Luke Bellocchi, “Assessing the Effectiveness of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996.”  International Journal of Intelligence 
and Counterintelligence 14:3  (July 2001): 366-367. 
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Methodologies to Measure the Consequence of Economic Espionage: 
Few studies measure the cost of economic espionage.  Not only are companies‟ economic losses 
often undisclosed but even estimations in the literature of total loss “only reflect inventory 
“snapshots” on the day the audit was performed.7  
 
The American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) report is the most comprehensive report on 
economic espionage. The data in the report is a compilation of survey responses from private 
companies that address monetary loss incurred from thefts. The companies were asked to rate the 
financial impact of thefts. For example, the 1997 report published by ASIS indicated that U.S. 
companies lost over $300 billion due to espionage targeting proprietary information.
8
 The 
specific methodology of the ASIS report is considered proprietary information, and therefore 
unavailable. Nonetheless, it stands to reason that the survey results, which concluded a $300 
billion loss, are laden with company bias. The report does not focus on an impartial measurement 
to identify the consequence of economic espionage, but on the common methods of theft and the 
appropriate risk mitigation strategies. This survey identifies the main threats and determines cost 
by industry through examining how a company‟s security policy, propensity to outsource, and 
type of information assets can all contribute to a company experiencing a higher loss. With this 
information, ASIS provides a better understanding of “the variety of ways in which information 
is compromised within the private sector and the effect that these losses have on U.S. 
corporations.”9 However, ASIS does not reveal the methodology used to establish this 
relationship and develop the loss estimations. 
 
Likewise, Marc Zwillinger and Christian Genetski, Adjunct Professors of Law at Georgetown 
University, do not disclose their methodology in their article “Calculating Loss Under the 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996.” However, Zwillinger and Genetski identify variables that 
could measure cost. This article examines the cost of economic espionage from a civil litigation 
perspective using a company‟s damage assessment.10  Based on past case rulings, Zwillinger and 
Genetski conclude that courts predominately calculate overall loss by using “lost profits,” and 
not the fair market value of the stolen information.
11
  The article explains that another common 
method of measuring loss is to base the monetary loss on the defendant‟s financial gain from the 
theft.
12
  This method is commonly applied when the company has not suffered an actual loss or 
when the loss did not equal the value of the stolen product.
13
  The authors also list “reasonable 
royalty” as a method for determining loss. “Reasonable royalty” calculates damages as an 
“amount that a willing buyer would have paid a willing seller to license the stolen trade secret.”14 
Lastly, courts may use the company‟s research and development costs to create an appropriate 
replacement cost.
15
  Although this article may examine the consequence of economic espionage 
                                               
7 Dave Drab. “Economic Espionage and Trade Secret Theft: Defending Against the Pickpockets of the New Millennium.” The 
Xerox Corporation.  (2003):4. <http://www.xerox.com/downloads/wpaper/x/xgs_business_insight_economic_espionage.pdf>.  
(accessed March 13, 2010). 
8 F.W. Rustmann Jr. CIA, Inc. Espionage and the Craft of Business Intelligence. Potomac Books Inc., 2002, p. 121.    
9 ASIS 2007. “Trends in Proprietary Information Loss.” Survey Report, ASIS & National Counterintelligence Executive, p. 1. 
10Marc J. Zwillinger and Christian S. Genetski. “Calculating Loss Under the Economic Espionage Act of  1996.” George Mason 
Law Review 323, (2001): 1. 
11 Ibid, 4. 
12 Ibid, 5. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid, 7.  
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from a corporate and legal perspective, its study of past cases and its identification of important 
variables associated with cost significantly contribute to the literature concerning the 
consequence of economic espionage. 
 
Although the majority of literature does not provide methodologies, Chris Carr and Larry 
Gorman of California Polytechnic State University include methodologies in their research. In 
their study entitled “The re-victimization of companies by the stock market who report trade 
secret theft under the Economic Espionage Act,” Carr and Gorman use statistical event study 
methodology to determine if “the publicity associated with the reporting of a trade secret theft to 
the government has a negative impact on the stock price of the victimized firm.”16  Out of the 23 
cases that were prosecuted under the EEA by 2001, Carr and Gorman drew their data from 11 
companies.  Carr and Gorman focused on the percentage change in the stock price and controlled 
for variables such as “broad stock market moves” and “the effect of all other extraneous firm-
specific news.”17  From their statistical test, they conclude that, on average, the public disclosure 
of a loss from economic espionage is “associated with a negative stock market response that is 
both statistically and economically significant.”18 
 
This study not only provides a method for measuring the cost of economic espionage to a 
company, but its discussion and findings have significant implications for understanding the 
consequence of economic espionage.  By quantifying cost, even within a limited scope, 
companies and law enforcement agencies have a starting point to report, assess, and protect 
against loss from economic espionage.
19
  However, the results of this study have no bearing on 
private companies that are not traded on the stock market.  For publicly traded companies, the 
shareholders have the power to influence change within a company.  Thus, a loss in shareholder 
profit from a trade secret theft can potentially lead to significant changes within the infrastructure 
of the company, and possibly result in more instability.  Second, as this study is dependent on the 
assumption that the theft was reported, companies may be less likely to report future theft, so as 
to protect jobs within the company.  While this study is an important step in quantifying the cost 
of economic espionage, its implications on the overall consequence are less clear.  
 
Although literature on the topic of economic espionage is available, literature that identifies 
methods to measure the consequence of economic espionage is limited. Due to these limitations, 
the research study was unable to modify a previously developed methodology. Rather, the 
researchers developed a new and unique methodology. Additional research that includes 
information on how to measure consequence will improve the ability to design methodologies 
that assess the consequence of an incident of economic espionage on the U.S. economy.  
  
                                               
16 Chris Carr and Larry Gorman. 2001. "The Re-Victimization of Companies by the Stock Market Who Report Trade Secret 
Theft under the Economic Espionage Act." The Business Lawyer 57(1). 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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Methodology  
Overview: 
There are inherent limitations with the model that the research team sought to minimize through 
the methodological process. External validity was difficult to improve because of the small 
sample of cases with available information and the absence of an independent source to 
corroborate the model‟s findings. Therefore, the research team devoted its efforts to improving 
the internal validity of the model. It was determined that internal validity could be improved by 
having experts in the field of economic espionage rank the importance of variables and questions 
designed to help measure these variables. Because the survey population was unresponsive to the 
survey request, the research team independently ranked the importance of the variables and their 
associated questions.   
 
The research team developed operational definitions for the variables and the questions within 
each variable. These definitions were designed to improve the survey participants‟ 
understanding, so that the survey participants had sufficient information to rank the variables and 
their associated questions. These definitions are the same definitions used in the model‟s user 
manual. Based on the feedback from the survey participants, the definitions were revised to 
better clarify each variable and the variable questions. 
 
The survey results provided by the research team were tabulated. The weights for each variable 
and the variable questions were derived from standardizing the survey results. These 
standardized scores were then inputted into the model‟s calculations, so that the model can 
generate a severity score based on the user‟s responses.   
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Operational Definitions of Variables: 
 
Overview: 
The research team created a list of potential variables and relevant questions to measure the 
consequence of economic espionage. During this process, the research team eliminated some 
variables and questions because of the inability to properly measure these factors.  
 
The research team then narrowed the model‟s variables and relevant questions. The research 
team defined four key variables: (1) Industry; (2) Characteristics of the Theft; (3) Cost; and (4) 
Beneficiary; and questions relevant to each of the four key variables.  
 
Definitions: 
(1) Industry: 
Industry measures the value added per industry as a percent of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and Susceptibility to economic espionage.  Industry, as defined by the U.S. Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, identifies the following14 key industries: agriculture, mining, 
utilities, construction, manufacturing, wholesale, retail, transportation, information, 
finance, professional services, educational services, arts, and other services. 
- GDP Percent of Value Added measures value added per industry as a percentage of 
GDP.  Value added is the difference between a product‟s sale price and the cost of the 
materials to produce the product.   
- Susceptibility measures „Inherent Vulnerability‟ (how inherently at risk the industry is 
to economic espionage) and „Attractiveness‟ (the likelihood that the industry will be 
targeted).  Susceptibility = Inherent Vulnerability + Attractiveness  
 
(2)  Characteristics of the Theft: 
 Characteristics of the Theft measures the impact of the scope of the attack, the network  
impact, and the characteristics of the thief/thieves on the overall impact of the attack on the 
company.  
- Scope of Attack examines at the range of the theft in terms of the amount of products 
and information stolen and the frequency of attacks.  
- Network Impact measures the amount of time a company‟s server or electronic 
networks were affected by the incident and any repair costs associated with the 
incident.  
- Placement of the thief/thieves examines the origin of the theft and the thief‟s 
association with the company.  
 
(3)  Cost: 
Cost measures the monetary loss sustained by a company that was the victim of economic 
espionage. Cost is a conclusive measure of stage of production, time spent in R&D, 
complete loss, product produced under high security, and restitution paid.  
- Stage of Production measures the three stages under which a product is developed. 
Stage of Production can be divided into three key stages: planning, R&D, and 
production. 
- Time Spent in R&D measures the amount of time a product (or information) stays in 
the research and development stage with the assumption that there is a positive 
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correlation between the length of time a product is in the R&D stage and overall 
production costs.  
- Complete Loss measures the amount of the finished product stolen from the company. 
Complete Loss is the total loss the company experiences from an incident of economic 
espionage with the assumption that if a product or information is in the final stage of 
production, then it will be a greater loss. A complete loss can be defined as an incident 
where the total or majority of the product is stolen, irretrievable, and used by the 
beneficiary.  
- High Security measures the level of security applied by the company during the stages 
of production to protect the value of the product or information with the assumption 
that there is a positive correlation between the level of security and the value of the 
product. 
- Restitution measures the amount of payment the company receives from the 
thief/thieves or beneficiary. „Restitution‟ assesses the total cost incurred by a company 
by subtracting the restitution payment from the overall loss the company experienced 
from the incident.   
 
(4)  Beneficiary: 
Beneficiary measures the ability of the beneficiary to exploit or intend to exploit the stolen  
product or information. Beneficiary is a conclusive measure of Human Development Index 
(HDI), urbanization ratio, and the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI). 
- HDI measures a country‟s level of development by examining the life expectancy at  
birth, the knowledge and education (as measured by the adult literacy rate and the  
combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment ratio), and standard of living  
(as measured by GDP per capita at the purchasing power parity).
 20
  
- Urbanization Ratio measures the ratio of a country‟s urbanized population, or the  
population living in urban areas, and rural population, or the population living outside of  
urban areas.  
- GCI level of competitiveness is an aggregation of “the many factors enabling national  
economies to achieve sustained economic growth and long-term prosperity.”21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
20 Thapa, Shyam. 1995. “The Human Development Index: A Portrait of the 75 Districts in Nepal.” Asia-Pacific  
Population Journal Volume Number: 10 (2): p3-14. United Nations Website. 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/escap/pop/journal/v10n2a1.htm>. (Accessed April 1, 2010). 
21 Sala-I-Martin, Xavier, et al. 2009. “The Global Competitiveness Report.” World Economic Forum 2009-2010  
Report: p3. <http://www.weforum.org/pdf/GCR09/GCR20092010fullreport.pdf>. (Accessed April 1, 2010). 
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Enhancing Internal Validity: 
 
Overview 
During the development of the model, several obstacles inherent with the study of economic 
espionage were identified. The nature of these obstacles hindered the validity of the model. 
Among these were the following: 
 
First, a general lack of information about the economic espionage cases coupled with the 
inability to obtain additional information from individuals involved in the case, either at the 
federal or company level, inhibited any serious analysis when developing the metric. The dearth 
of information rendered the researchers unable to achieve a numerical value for “loss of money” 
or “economic damage to industry.” Therefore, at the outset of the project, the researchers 
operated under the assumption that any metric or measurement applied to the model would be 
qualitative. 
 
Second, the number of sample sizes (in this instance, case studies) was too few to ascertain 
quantitative values. In total, twelve case studies were provided to the group. Using the model and 
its assigned weighing system, the researchers ran the Lockwood, et al. (please see Appendix) 
case study through the model to produce results. It is important to note that the lack of a 
sufficient number of case studies rendered an inability to numerically apply the model across an 
industry as a whole. Therefore, the case study only serves to support the model‟s qualitative 
analysis, to demonstrate that an economic espionage case can be run through the model, and to 
produce a logical result. As a result of these limitations, the researchers had to determine the 
severity of the loss given the qualitative measures produced by the model. 
 
Third, the length of time that it takes the consumer to receive the case‟s information further 
complicated the process of achieving greater validity. This is an extension of the first 
predicament, lack of information. For example, while a case of economic espionage may receive 
media attention, this publicity does not equate to the public access of court documents. Rather, in 
many instances, such as that of the Ye and Zhong case (please see Appendix), court documents 
remain sealed and unavailable to the public. Additionally, it is highly unlikely that the 
prosecuting attorney‟s office will provide any details on the case because of the confidential 
nature and overall sensitivity of the case and proceedings. Further confounding these issues, are 
instances where defendants are either going through retrial or assisting the government in 
additional prosecutions. 
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Internal Validity 
Given the limitations mentioned above, the research team sought internal validity measures to 
increase the model‟s strength. Internal validity is the extent to which the model‟s design is likely 
to avoid bias. In developing the model, the research team attempted to gain internal validity by 
pursuing a course of action whereby weights were assigned to the various questions in the model. 
Due to the limited available information on cases of economic espionage, the inability of 
government experts in the field to openly discuss cases, and the research team‟s limited access to 
economic espionage experts, it was determined that the research team represented the most 
cohesive sample of individuals with a substantial understanding of past economic espionage 
cases. A total of 6 members of the research team participated in the internal validation process.   
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External Experts Survey: 
The purpose of the survey was to enhance the internal validity during the process of assigning a 
weighing scale to the model‟s key variables. The survey asked respondents to rank the level of 
importance on a scale of “low, medium, and high” for each variable and subset of variables 
included in the model. 
  
A ranking process was applied because it allowed the research team to determine the level of 
importance each variable and subset of variables had on the model.  A high level of importance 
was correlated with a greater weight (severity) than a lower level of importance (not as severe).  
 
The survey population targeted economic espionage experts. The survey population sample 
identified a group of less than 30 experts from academia, the federal government, and the private 
sector.  
 
The survey was divided into two sections: industry susceptibility and level of variable 
importance per industry. The first section “industry susceptibility” was designed to measure the 
level of susceptibility in each of the industries. Susceptibility was defined as the level of 
vulnerability and the level of attractiveness present in a given industry. The respondents were 
asked to rank the level of importance for both inherent vulnerability and attractiveness within 
each industry.  The second section “level of variable importance per industry” identified the 
other three independent variables: (1) characteristics of the theft; (2) cost; and (3) beneficiary; 
and their associated variable subsets. For each industry, the respondent was asked to rank the 
level of importance that each of the three main variables has on that specific industry as well as 
the level of importance each of the variable subsets has on that specific industry. 
 
The survey resulted in only 12 respondents. Given the variations in the small sample size and 
direct feedback from the survey sample, it was concluded there was confusion on the 
terminology “economic espionage.” Many academics with a background in intelligence defined 
“espionage” traditionally and did not see a relationship between espionage and industries. 
Additionally, some survey respondents noted the length of the survey and the amount of time 
required to rank the variables and variable subsets.   
 
As a result of the inconclusive responses and comments on confusion and uncertainty from the 
survey sample, it was determined it would be more accurate for the research team to rank the 
variables and their associated subsets. Six of the seven members of the research team 
independently completed the survey. After their results were received, the respondents‟ answers 
were averaged together and the weighing scale was created. The survey enabled the researchers 
to assign a weighing scale to the model‟s variables while concurrently bolstering internal validity 
and mitigating bias. 
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Variable Weights: 
 
Weights 
The variables were measured on different numerical scales, which required standardization to 
weigh the variables. The standardization was conducted using a Z-score for each variable in the 
model. The Z-score, which shows the number of standard deviations an observation is away from 
the mean, is calculated by taking each observation in a population of numbers and subtracting 
each observation from the total population‟s mean. All of these values are then divided by the 
population‟s standard deviation. After calculating the Z-score for each variable, the research 
team normalized the Z-scores on a scale from 0 to 1.  The normal density function produced a 
cumulative standard normal distribution.   
 
The Process of Applying Weights: An Example 
For example, consider the variable „Industry: Information‟ and the variable of „Cost.‟ The „Cost‟ 
variable consisted of five questions designed to measure „Cost.‟ For each observation, the 
research team calculated the Z-score by using the mean and standard deviation from the five 
questions within the variable „Cost.‟ The user will select a number for the required question (-, 0, 
1, 2, 3). In this example, the user selects „Stage of Production,‟ and believes the theft occurred 
during „finalized product stage.‟ Thus, the user assigns a rank of „3.‟ That score is then 
multiplied by the weight of the calculated standardized Z-score for that individual question. In 
this example, the weight is „.1424.‟ That same process is then repeated for every question in the 
„Cost‟ variable. The products of the five numbers, or the answers to the questions referenced 
under the „Cost‟ variable, are summed. The sum of these five numbers is then multiplied by the 
weight assigned to „Cost‟ under the Information industry. In this example, the weight is „.6084.‟ 
The same process is repeated for all questions under „Characteristics of the Theft‟ variable.  
 
Under the „Beneficiary‟ variable, the user is only required to select a country. When the user 
selects the country, the model performs an internal calculation. The calculation conducted here is 
similar to the calculation used in the „Cost‟ variable. However, the weight for the „Beneficiary‟ 
variable includes a combined weight based on significance of the three variable questions and 
their predetermined values. The „Beneficiary‟ variable‟ consists of three measurements: Human 
Development Index (HDI), Urbanization Ratio, and the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI). 
Because HDI, Urbanization Ratio, and GCI, were all ranked on different scales, they had to be 
standardized using the Z-score. The weights for the „Beneficiary‟ variable‟s three questions, and 
the „Beneficiary‟ variable itself, were calculated using the same process as „Cost.‟  
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Model 
Overview: 
 
The model is intended to measure the potential consequence on the U.S. economy due to an 
individual incident of economic espionage.  A lofty goal of the research was to develop a metric 
that would generate a dollar figure representative of the monetary loss from an incident of 
economic espionage.  Initially, a list of variables to measure the impact of cost was developed. 
However, specific information from the company was needed to incorporate these variables into 
a model. Because this information is not readily available, it was unfeasible for the research team 
to develop a metric to generate a dollar figure representative of the monetary loss from an 
incident of economic espionage. Therefore, the research team chose to create a model that uses 
ordinal scales to assess consequence. The research team designed an electronic user interface and 
developed a user manual to accompany the model. 
 
The model consists of four variables that incorporate subjective and objective measurements.  
The model contains two variables that are self-generated: „Industry‟ and „Beneficiary.‟  The 
model operates under the assumption that an EEA indictment was rendered. An EEA indictment 
requires that a theft or intended theft occurred, which means that the targeted industry and the 
beneficiary or intended beneficiary is identifiable. Therefore, the user of the model must select 
which industry and which beneficiary or intended beneficiary is applicable to the incident. 
 
The model includes two variables that are not self-generated, but subjective: „Cost‟ and 
„Characteristics of the Theft.‟ Based on his/her judgments and opinions, the user determines 
severity by identifying key factors important to the variables.  
 
The model provides a value based on the user‟s ordinal inputs and the generated values from 
indices. This value represents the level of consequence, in terms of „Low,‟ „Moderate,‟ and 
„High,‟ that the specific incident of economic espionage had on the U.S. economy.  
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Assumptions: 
An evaluation of different variables was conducted during the initial stages of the model‟s 
development. It was determined that the functionality of the model was based on two 
assumptions. These key assumptions include: an Economic Espionage Act (EEA) indictment and 
the absence of company cooperation.  
 
Economic Espionage Act (EEA) Indictment 
The first assumption is that each case inputted into the model will include at least one EEA 
indictment issued to the defendant. Issuing an indictment under the EEA is a complex process 
that requires high coordination and cooperation between the federal government and private 
companies. The indictment process includes the following steps:
22
  
 
(1) The company is victimized. 
(2) The company becomes aware of the incident. 
(3) The company conducts an internal investigation. 
(4) The company notifies the FBI and/or another federal government office. 
(5) FBI determines if the known information is sufficient to pursue an investigation.  
(6) FBI contacts the District Attorney‟s office that has jurisdictional authority where the incident 
occurred. 
(7) FBI launches an investigation to collect evidence. 
(8) FBI and the District Attorney‟s office review the evidence. At this point, they may determine 
there is insufficient evidence to support an indictment and will drop the case. There are many 
cases are terminated at this point. 
(9) If the FBI and District Attorney‟s office conclude there is sufficient evidence, the District 
Attorney‟s office issues an indictment(s). 
 
It is important that EEA statutes are applicable to each case tested under the model because the 
EEA represents the official legal guidelines for assessing incidents of economic espionage. An 
EEA indictment is necessary because it indicates there is sufficient evidence to try a case under 
the EEA, and it validates the case information inputted into the model.   
 
Incomplete Case Information 
The second assumption is that there will be incomplete case information for each case inputted 
into the model because of a lack of company cooperation. A company will be reluctant to 
provide full information on an incident of economic espionage because of the negativity 
associated with the incident. Studies conducted on incidents of security breaches, trade secret 
theft, and economic espionage indicates that companies tend to provide minimal to no 
information on an incident. The following two studies are significant examples of this trend: 
 
(1) The 2007 report entitled “Trends in Proprietary Information Loss” produced by ASIS 
indicated a survey response rate of 10.3%. 
(2) The 2009 report entitled “CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey – Executive Summary” 
produced by CSI indicated a survey response rate of 7.3%. 
                                               
22 Matthew A. Parrella, Assistant U.S. Attorney and Chief of Computer Hacking/Intellectual Property (CHIP) Unit Conducted 
(personal communication via phone interview, March 4, 2010). 
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This model is intended to be used by a U.S. federal employee with working knowledge of 
economic espionage.  For example, a Department of Homeland Security employee would not be 
able to access private company information without a subpoena and would not have special 
access to sealed case information. Therefore, the model was designed with the acknowledgement 
that there would be incomplete case information. This assumption influenced the identification 
of the variables and each of their associated questions. The variables and each of their associated 
questions were included in the model because they would produce a measurable consequence by 
compensating for the incomplete case information.  
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Variables: 
Overview  
The model identified four key variables to measure the consequence of economic espionage. 
These variables include: (1) Industry; (2) Characteristics of the Theft; (3) Cost; and (4) 
Beneficiary. Each of these four variables is calculated by a subset of variables. 
 
(1) Industry: 
Industry is a conclusive measure of two variables: value added per industry as a percent of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and Susceptibility to economic espionage. The U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis identifies 14 key industries in the U.S. economy: agriculture, mining, 
utilities, construction, manufacturing, wholesale, retail, transportation, information, finance, 
professional services, educational services, arts, and other services. 
 
Value added is the difference between the sale price of a product and the cost of materials to 
produce it. Two separate dimensions constitute the second variable, Susceptibility: „Inherent 
Vulnerability,‟ how inherently at risk the industry is to economic espionage and „Attractiveness,‟ 
the likelihood that the industry will be targeted. 
 
Susceptibility = Inherent Vulnerability + Attractiveness  
 
The Inherent Vulnerability of an industry to economic espionage refers to how susceptible it is 
due to the nature of what is valued within that industry. Inherent Vulnerability can be 
conceptualized as the difference between tacit, or implicit, knowledge and explicit knowledge. 
Tacit knowledge is information which is not easily quantified or objectively defined, such as an 
art form. As a result of its nature, tacit knowledge is difficult to transfer, and thus, is not easily 
shared, let alone stolen. Explicit knowledge is that which can be expressed mathematically, or 
verbally as a written set of instructions. Most of the sciences fall into this category. This is a 
relevant consideration for economic espionage because it is very difficult to transfer tacit 
knowledge intentionally, let alone for it to be openly shared. For example, information 
technology or manufacturing process data is explicitly defined and neatly stored, which leaves it 
more vulnerable to hostile acquisition than an appreciation for supply chain management, which 
must be uniquely applied to each situation in which it is implemented.  
 
The attractiveness of an industry to economic espionage refers to how likely it is to be targeted 
due to the industry‟s general appeal. Attractiveness can be conceptualized by identifying several 
factors that make the industry appealing, such as the type of products targeted; that which is 
valued by economic spies; industries that have a competitive advantage; industries that embrace 
a niche market; and those that claim a high product demand. For example, economic spies 
desiring a new supply chain management system may find the retail industry very attractive. 
High product demand industries and those that embrace niche markets can be seen developing 
highly advanced computer chips or software. 
 
The industry variable is important to the consequence of economic espionage because it 
incorporates the percent of value added to each industry in terms of GDP and each industry‟s 
associated level of susceptibility to an incident of economic espionage. Additionally, the industry 
variable allows the metric to be personalized for the individual user. Each user identifies the 
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industry affected by the incident of economic espionage. Because different weights are assigned 
to the variables, the model will render different results depending upon which industry is 
selected by the user. 
 
In the model, GDP measures how important the industry is to the U.S. economy as a whole. 
Susceptibility balances the weight of GDP by measuring each industry‟s level of attractiveness 
and defense against economic espionage. The Susceptibility variable permits a particular 
industry, one whose GDP percentage may not be as great to the entire U.S. economy as other 
industries, to reflect a greater overall weight (importance), given that it may be a frequent target 
of economic espionage. The „Information‟ industry serves as a relevant example. „Information‟ 
yields a high level of „Susceptibility,‟ but only accounts for 4.2% of GDP, well below the 
ranking of several other industries. Because the level of threat is far greater for „Information‟ 
than other industries, Susceptibility becomes increasing important to the model. Thus, higher 
Susceptibility rankings add weight to an industry, even if the industry is only a small portion of 
GDP. Given the GDP and Susceptibility variables, it is expected that the level of importance for 
insignificant industries, or those with low GDPs and low Susceptibility scores, will pale in 
comparison to significant industries, or those with high GDPs and high Susceptibility rankings. 
Additionally, political risk is inherently measured in the Susceptibility variable because 
particular industries have a greater disposition to public concern (information, manufacturing, 
etc). 
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1. Agriculture: 
Farms and Forestry, fishing, hunting, and related activities. 
2.  Mining: 
Oil and gas extraction, Mining (except oil and gas), and Support activities for mining 
3. Utilities: 
4. Construction: 
5. Manufacturing: (divided into two sections: Durable and Nondurable Goods) 
A. Durable Goods: 
Wood products, Nonmetallic mineral products; Primary metals; Fabricated metal products;  
Machinery; Computer and electronic products; Electrical equipment; appliances and  
components; Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts; Other transportation equipment;  
Furniture and related products; and Miscellaneous manufacturing 
B. Nondurable Goods: 
Food and beverage and tobacco products; Textile mills and textile product mills; Apparel and  
leather and allied products; Paper products; Printing and related support activities; Petroleum  
and coal products; Chemical products; Plastics and rubber products 
6. Wholesale Trade: 
7. Retail Trade: 
8. Transportation and Warehousing: 
Air transportation; Rail transportation; Water transportation; Truck transportation; Transit and  
ground passenger transportation; Pipeline transportation; Other transportation and support  
activities; Warehousing and storage 
9.  Information: 
Publishing industries (includes software); Motion picture and sound recording industries;  
Broadcasting and telecommunications; Information and data processing services 
10. Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, Rental, and Leasing: 
A. Finance and insurance: 
Federal Reserve banks, credit intermediation, and related activities; Securities, commodity  
contracts, and investments; Insurance carriers and related activities; Funds, trusts, and other  
financial vehicles 
B. Real estate and rental and leasing: 
Real estate; Rental and leasing services and lenders of intangible assets 
11. Professional and Business Services: 
A. Professional, scientific, and technical services: 
Legal services; Computer systems design and related services; Miscellaneous professional,  
scientific, and technical services 
B. Management of companies and enterprises. 
C. Administrative and waste management services: 
Administrative and support services; Waste management and remediation services 
12. Educational services, health care, and social assistance: 
A. Health care and social assistance, Includes: 
Ambulatory health care services; Hospitals and nursing and residential care facilities; Social  
assistance 
13. Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services: 
A. Arts, entertainment, and recreation: 
Performing arts, spectator sports, museums, and related activities; Amusements, gambling, and  
recreation industries 
B. Accommodation and food services: 
Accommodation; Food services and drinking places 
14.  Other Services: (except government) 
Overview of 14 U.S. Industries: 
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(2) Characteristics of the Theft: 
„Characteristics of the Theft‟ is a conclusive measure of the scope of the attack, the network 
impact, and the placement of the thief/thieves. „Characteristics of the Theft‟ identifies key factors 
that influence the impact of the theft on the company. The scope of the attack can be defined as 
the range of impact the theft had on the firm in terms of tangible and intangible damages. The 
network impact can be defined as any theft in which a company‟s server and/or electronic 
network system is affected. The placement of the thief/thieves examines if the individual(s) was 
an internal actor, or employed by the company; an external actor, or a non-employee of the 
company; or a combination of both internal and external actors.   
 
The scope of attack examines the range of the theft in terms of the amount of products and 
information stolen and the frequency of attacks. Network impact measures the amount of time a 
company‟s server or electronic networks were affected by the incident and any associated repair 
costs. The placement of the thief/thieves examines the origin of the theft and the thief‟s 
association with the company.  
 
An example of an internal theft would be an employee who steals a patent from his company. An 
example of external theft would be someone who breaks into a company and steals that same 
patent. Research findings support the conclusion that thieves with „insider‟ access cause more 
damage to the company, which results in a greater company loss.
23
  
 
(3) Cost: 
Cost is a conclusive measure of stage of production, time spent in R&D, complete loss, product 
produced under high security, and restitution paid. The cost variable measures the monetary loss 
sustained by a company that was the victim of economic espionage.  This variable aims to create 
a comprehensive understanding of the amount lost by assessing the value of the product lost and 
the company‟s investment in the production of that product.  
 
The first measure of the Cost variable is „Stage of Production.‟ „Stage of Production‟ contributes 
to the measure of cost because a company‟s investment in developing a trade secret increases 
with each production stage.  Stage of Production evaluates the three stages under which a 
product is developed. These three stages include: planning, R&D, and production. During the 
planning stage, the input of factor endowments, namely labor and capital, is limited because the 
primary purpose of this stage is for a small and controlled group of employees and researchers to 
formulate ideas and plans.  Thus, the likelihood of a product being stolen in the planning stage is 
extremely low.
24
  Additionally, if an incident of economic espionage was detected, the company 
would have greater flexibility to adjust the development of its product and protect intellectual 
property during this stage than in subsequent stages of production.  
 
The second measure of the Cost variable is „Time Spent in R&D‟. Time Spent in R&D measures 
the amount of time a product or information spent in the research and development stage of 
production. A company invests the greatest amount of capital and labor during the research and 
                                               
23 Lisa A. Kramer and Richard J. Heuer Jr. “America‟s Increased Vulnerability to Insider Espionage.” International Journal of 
Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 20,  (2007): 50-64. 
24 ASIS 2007. “Trends in Proprietary Information Loss.” Survey Report, ASIS & National Counterintelligence Executive. 
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development stage.
25
  It is reasonable to assume a positive correlation between the length of time 
a product is in the R&D stage and the overall production costs. Additionally, knowledge about 
the total R&D costs is important because there is a precedent in economic espionage cases to use 
total R&D costs as “an appropriate measure of replacement costs.”26 Thus, information on the 
length of time associated with the production of a trade secret or trade secret process is important 
in determining the overall cost of an incident of economic espionage.  
 
The third measure of the Cost variable is „Complete Loss.‟ Complete Loss can be defined as the 
amount of the finished product stolen from the company. Although a product is most vulnerable 
to economic espionage during the R&D stage,
27
 an incident is more likely to occur during the 
production stage. The production stage is the final stage and includes an evaluation of the total 
loss incurred by the company. As the product or process develops through the three stages of 
production, the overall production cost increases. Therefore, the loss of the product or process 
during the final phase of the production stage is the most expensive.  By this point, the company 
has completed the most costly production stage, which makes the exploitation of the product or 
process more valuable to the thief because it reduces the overall cost for the beneficiary. An 
incident of economic espionage during the final phase of the production stage enables the 
thief/thieves to enter the market as a competitor, which denies the company its expected 
competitive advantage. Furthermore, detection of an incident of economic espionage during the 
production stage is limited. However, if a product is stolen during the production stage, it is not 
necessarily a complete loss as the amount stolen can vary. When a product is stolen, “whatever 
can be rescued is a net gain and…a disaster control approach is critical.”28  A minor loss can be 
defined as an incident in which the product or information stolen is insufficient to allow a 
beneficiary to reproduce the product, or the trade secret never reached its intended beneficiary. . 
An example of this type of loss is seen in the Ye-Zhong case when the suspects were arrested 
prior to the information being transported to the beneficiary, in this case China (please see 
Appendix). A complete loss can be defined as an incident of economic espionage where the total 
or majority of the product or information is stolen, irretrievable, and used by the beneficiary.   
 
„High Security‟ is the fourth measure of the Cost variable. High Security is defined by enhanced 
security measures implemented by the company during the stages of production to protect the 
value of the product or information. A successful theft under high security in the R&D stage 
should be considered as a greater loss than a theft under low security. Although companies can 
incur additional costs by providing increased security during R&D,
29
 the existence of increased 
security minimizes the likelihood of an incident of economic espionage. It is also reasonable to 
assume that a product under high security has an inherently higher value because the company is 
willing to increase production costs to better protect the security of the product.   
 
 
 
                                               
25 ASIS 2007. “Trends in Proprietary Information Loss.” Survey Report, ASIS & National Counterintelligence Executive. 
26 Marc J. Zwillinger and Christian S. Genetski. “Calculating Loss Under the Economic Espionage Act of  1996.” George Mason 
Law Review, 323, (2001): 7. 
27 ASIS 2007. “Trends in Proprietary Information Loss.” Survey Report, ASIS & National Counterintelligence Executive. 
28 Samli A Coskun and Laurence Jacobs. “Counteracting Global Industrial Espionage: A Damage Control Strategy.” Business 
and Society Review, 108, (2001):1. 
29 ASIS 2007. “Trends in Proprietary Information Loss.”  Survey Report, ASIS & National Counterintelligence Executive. 
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The fifth measure of the Cost variable is „Restitution.‟ Restitution can be defined as any amount 
of payment the company receives from the thief/thieves or beneficiary. Restitution assesses the 
total cost incurred by a company by subtracting the restitution payment from the overall loss the 
company experienced from the incident. The company can file a civil litigation suit against an 
individual/individuals if the economic espionage case identifies the thief/thieves responsible for 
the incident.  While the restitution payment will not recover the full damages experienced by the 
company, it can minimize the overall monetary loss experienced by the company. 
 
(4) Beneficiary: 
Beneficiary is a conclusive measure of the Human Development Index (HDI), Urbanization 
Ratio, and the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI). This category measures the ability of the 
beneficiary to exploit the stolen product or information. Beneficiary can be defined as the foreign 
entity that is intended to benefit or did benefit from an incident of economic espionage.  
 
The HDI measures a country‟s level of development by examining the life expectancy at birth, 
the knowledge and education (as measured by the adult literacy rate and the combined primary, 
secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment ratio), and standard of living (as measured by GDP per 
capita at the purchasing power parity).
 30
 The Urbanization Ratio measures the ratio of a 
country‟s urbanized population, or the population living in urban areas. The GCI level of 
competitiveness is an aggregation of “the many factors enabling national economies to achieve 
sustained economic growth and long-term prosperity.”31 
 
The „Beneficiary‟ variable is important to the model because it identifies the receptive party of 
the theft. Beneficiary includes any foreign entity who receives the product. For example, if a 
product or information was stolen and delivered to China, then the beneficiary would be China. 
Beneficiary also includes any foreign entity who is the intended recipient of the product or 
information. For example, if a product or information was stolen and there was an attempted 
delivery to China, but there was never proof the product and information ever reached China, 
then the beneficiary would be China. In many cases prosecuted under EEA, the perpetrators are 
apprehended prior to the product or information reaching the intended beneficiary.  Therefore, 
intended beneficiary is essential because a receptive foreign entity must be identified for a case 
to be brought under the EEA. 
 
Additionally, it is important to note that the intended beneficiary is important to the model 
because of the many unknowns in the model, which may impact the final severity score. 
Although the research team attempted to compensate for many of these unknowns, the research 
team found it difficult to balance them given the subjective nature of the model. For example, 
consider an incident of economic espionage in manufacturing design. Rather than successfully 
deliver the design to their intended beneficiary, the perpetrators were arrested before the product 
could be delivered to the beneficiary. While the model can be applied to the incident, it cannot 
gauge some of the unknown consequences: Did anyone else see the design prior to the arrest? 
Were copies of the design made? All of these are examples of potential “idea diffusion.” Thus, 
                                               
30 Shyam Thapa. “The Human Development Index: A Portrait of the 75 Districts in Nepal.” Asia-Pacific Population Journal 10, 
2  (1995): 3-14. United Nations Website. <http://www.un.org/Depts/escap/pop/journal/v10n2a1.htm>.  (Accessed April 1, 
2010). 
31 Xavier Sala-I-Martin, et al. “The Global Competitiveness Report.” World Economic Forum 2009-2010 Report (2009): 
3.<http://www.weforum.org/pdf/GCR09/GCR20092010fullreport.pdf>. (Accessed April 1, 2010). 
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the concept of “idea diffusion” weighs heavily on the negative implications associated with 
intended beneficiary. As a result, many cases receive a higher severity score due to the industry 
impacted and its various unknown consequences. Thus, „Beneficiary‟ or „Intended Beneficiary‟ 
is important to the final severity score. 
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The Severity Score: 
The severity score measures the overall consequence of an incident of economic espionage on 
the U.S. economy in terms of „Low,‟ „Moderate,‟ and „High‟ severity. The severity score 
incorporates the model‟s four main variables into two primary components: „Industry‟ and „Case 
Variables.‟ Industry is derived from an equal combination of the percentage of GDP (value 
added) and „Susceptibility‟ of each of the 14 industries. Case Variables include the 
„Characteristics of the Theft,‟ „Cost,‟ and „Beneficiary‟ variables. The relationship of the values 
between Industry and Case Variables requires additional justification because of its subjective 
nature.  
 
Initially, the research team assigned a greater weight to „Industry‟ than „Case Variables.‟ 
However, this arbitrary weight was dismissed because the standardization process inherently 
weighed the variables within „Industry‟ greater than the „Case Variables‟. The research team 
believes this inherent bias toward „Industry‟ is acceptable because the industry in which a theft 
occurs sets a range for how detrimental an individual incident of economic espionage is on the 
U.S. economy. 
  
The overall severity score corresponds to either a „Low,‟ „Moderate,‟ or „High‟ consequence.     
 
 Low [less than .3742]: The impact of the case on the U.S. economy is low.  A case that has a 
low severity score does not have the potential to render severe loss to the U.S. economy.   
 Moderate [greater than or equal to .3742 or less than or equal to .6004]: The impact of 
the case on the U.S. economy is moderate.  A case that has a moderate severity score has the 
potential to render significant loss to the U.S. economy.   
 High [greater than .6004]: The impact of the case on the U.S. economy is high.  A case that 
has a high severity score has the potential to render severe loss to the U.S. economy.   
 
The ranges for „Low,‟ „Moderate,‟ and „High‟ consequence were derived by generating a random 
selection of model inputs and plotting their corresponding severity scores on a distribution. The 
researchers conducted 150 random combinations, which were inputted into the model to 
calculate 150 severity scores.  One hundred and fifty severity scores were placed on a 
distribution from 0 to 1.  This distribution reflected the range and density of the model.  The 
severity score distribution has a mean of .4873 and a standard deviation of .1131.  By adding the 
standard deviation of .1131to the mean of .4873 and then subtracting the standard deviation of 
.1131 from the mean of .4873, the numerical bounds for Moderate consequence are derived. Low 
consequence is defined as any severity score below .3742.  Moderate consequence is defined as 
any severity score greater than or equal to .3742 and less than or equal to .6004.  High 
consequence is defined as any severity score above .6004.  On a normal distribution, 68.2% of 
the results fall within one standard deviation from the mean.  Because the model was constructed 
under the assumption that the results would adhere to a normal distribution, the vast majority of 
the results will fall within the Moderate severity score, or within one standard deviation from the 
mean. Therefore, the significance of this model is its ability to correctly identify extreme 
incidents of economic espionage.     
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Overview of the User Interface Model: 
The user interface model is designed to be simple and intuitive, with drop-down boxes allowing 
the user to select his/her responses to each question. Included in the interface are 14 industries, 
each of which is divided by separate tabs at the bottom of the spreadsheet.  
 
Below is an example of the user interface model. In this particular example, the user chose the 
“Mining” industry. Based on this choice, a predetermined value from the “Industry” variable was 
assigned. Given the research team‟s desire to minimize any user confusion or uncertainty, this 
value does not appear in the interface. Rather, the value assigned to “Mining” is automatically 
included in the final calculation of the severity score.  
 
After selecting the industry, the user then answered the questions for the variables „Characteristic 
of the Theft‟ and „Cost.‟ Answers to the questions for these variables are dependent on the 
components of the specific incident of economic espionage. For the variable „Beneficiary,‟ the 
user selected „Venezuela.‟ All of these answers produced a severity score of „.3529,‟ which 
correlates with a „Low‟ consequence on the U.S. economy.  
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Mining Industry 
Definition: 
Oil and gas extraction, mining (except oil and gas), and support activities for mining. 
 
Number Variables  Questions   Instructions User Inputs 
1 Mining Industry:         
            
2 
Characteristics of 
the Theft Variable: 
      
  
     Placement of the thief?  Reference user manual for Definitions. Internal 
     Scope of the theft?  Reference user manual for Definitions. 2 
    
Information network 
impact? 
 Reference user manual for Definitions. 
0 
           
3 Cost Variable:         
    Stage of production.   Reference user manual for Definitions. 2 
    Complete loss?   Reference user manual for Definitions. 1 
    
Time spent in research 
and development? 
  Reference user manual for Definitions. 
2 
    Restitution paid?   Reference user manual for Definitions. 0 
    
Product under high 
security? 
  Reference user manual for Definitions. 
3 
            
4 
Beneficiary 
Variable: 
      
  
    Beneficiary country?   Select Country Venezuela 
    Severity Score 0.3529807 
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Lockwood, et al. Test Case Simulation: 
In an effort to prove the efficacy of the model, the research team conducted a test simulation. 
The research team selected the Lockwood, et al. case as the sample case due to its plethora of 
information. The research team randomly selected a sample of graduate students to participate in 
the simulation.  
 
Selection of the Sample Group 
The sample group was randomly selected via a computer randomizing program. The sample 
group consisted of 12 graduate students selected from a population of second year graduate 
students enrolled in the International Affairs program at the Bush School. The research team 
selected the sample from this population because it was representative of individuals with a 
working knowledge of intelligence and economics, who possess a rudimentary understanding of 
economic espionage. Additionally, the user interface was designed with the intent of use by 
government employees. Therefore, the research team concluded the academic background of the 
selected sample was representative of future users. 
 
Simulation 
The simulation group was given a one-page summary of the Lockwood, et al. case. The user 
manual provided information on how to use the model and explanations of the model‟s variables. 
The simulation was conducted one time over a thirty-minute period.  
 
Results 
The simulation proved that the model succeeded in its intended purpose: the user could take a 
selected case of economic espionage and use the model to render an appropriate consequence. 
There were several trends in the simulation group‟s responses, as all simulation participants were 
able to objectively answer questions related to the variables.
 32
  
 
Lessons learned 
The simulation group provided important feedback about the terms and operational definitions 
associated with the model‟s variables. The research team adjusted these terms and definitions to 
better clarify the model and its intended purpose.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
32 At the time of the simulation, this variable was titled “End User.” 
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Conclusion 
The research presented in this paper will contribute to the future analysis of economic 
espionage. Unlike previous research, this study goes beyond highlighting targeted industries and 
focuses on the variables that have the greatest impact on the consequence of economic 
espionage. In addition to expounding on previous research, this study provides a user interface to 
measure the consequence of economic espionage. The model is designed to serve as a template 
for federal government agencies. The federal government can apply publically available 
information about specific incidents of economic espionage to the model, which will then 
generate a customized consequence. However, it is the opinion of the research team that 
obtaining more detailed data and employing different measures for each variable would further 
enhance this model.   
 
Detailed data can be achieved by obtaining information from companies that experienced an 
incident of economic espionage. Industry specific information would aid the model‟s developers 
in more accurately assigning weights to each variable and its measures. Therefore, detailed data 
would allow the user to narrow the range of severity and the level of consequence experienced 
from an incident of economic espionage.  Additionally, detailed data would improve overall 
statistical analysis allowing the user to include more complicated measures, such as the change 
in stock market prices or political consequence.  
 
The concept of internal validity is a gap in the model. Although the research team attempted to 
achieve internal validity by having external experts provide feedback on the significance of each 
of the variables and their questions, poor response rates inhibited internal validity. Therefore, the 
research team acted in the stead of experts in weighing the variables.   
 
To improve internal validity, the research team recommends that experts in the field of economic 
espionage provide feedback on the level of significance for the four variables and their 
associated questions. Although the research team provided feedback on the significance levels, 
the research team concluded that the process enhanced the assignment of weights because of the 
team‟s greater understanding of the topic of economic espionage. Thus, it is the strong opinion of 
the research team that the weights used in this model will remain similar to any weights based on 
feedback from economic espionage experts. 
 
In moving forward, the current model serves as a template that companies and the government 
can use to identify the level of consequence on the U.S. economy based on a specific incident of 
economic espionage. The model‟s variables, weights, and internal calculations provide a method 
of identifying the consequence an incident of economic espionage has on the overall U.S. 
economy. It is the hope of the research team that the methodology developed in this study will 
contribute greatly to the ongoing analysis of the impact of economic espionage.  
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Common EEA Terminology  
Consequence/Impact:   
Consequence is the overall damage caused by an event. Along with probability, consequence is 
an input used to calculate risk.    
 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996:   
The act criminalizes economic espionage and industrial espionage. Section 1831 criminalizes the 
disclosure of a trade secret to a foreign entity. Section 1832 criminalizes the transfer of trade 
secrets for interstate commerce.   
 
Economic Espionage:  
Economic Espionage is the knowing misappropriation of trade secrets with the knowledge or 
intent that the offense will benefit a foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign 
agent. Misappropriation includes, but is not limited to, stealing, copying, altering, destroying, 
transmitting, sending, receiving, buying, possessing, or conspiring to obtain trade secrets without 
authorization. Section 101(a) of the Economic Espionage Act (EEA) of 1996 criminalizes 
economic espionage.
33
 
 
Industrial Espionage:  
Industrial espionage is the knowing misappropriation of trade secrets related to or included in a 
product that is produced and/or placed in interstate or foreign commerce for the economic benefit 
of anyone other than the owner, with the knowledge or intent that the offense will injure the 
owner of that trade secret. Misappropriation includes, but is not limited to stealing, copying, 
altering, destroying, transmitting, sending, receiving, buying, possessing, or conspiring to 
misappropriate trade secrets without authorization. Industrial espionage is also criminalized 
under the EEA.
34
 
 
Probability:  
Probability is the likelihood that an event will occur over time.  In this situation, probability, 
along with consequence, is used to determine risk.   
 
Reverse Engineering:  
Reverse engineering is the exploitation of profitable information for the benefit of another 
company.  The information does not have to be acquired clandestinely.   
 
Risk:  
Risk is an expression of the impact of an undesired event in terms of the event‟s severity and 
likelihood.
35
 
 
 
                                               
33 Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive. “Annual Report to Congress on the Foreign Economic Collection and 
Industrial Espionage,” FY 2008,  July 23, 2009, pg. V. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Association, 8040.4, Appendix 1, June 26, 1998, p. 1. 
<http://www.faa.gov/library/manuals/aviation/risk_management/ss_handbook/media/app_g_1200.PDF>. (accessed May 1, 
2010). 
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Trade Secret:  
The term „trade secret‟ means all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, 
economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, 
formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, 
whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized 
physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if the owner thereof has 
taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and the information derives 
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not 
being readily ascertainable through proper means by the public.
36
 
 
  
                                               
36 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. 1839 (3).  
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Economic Espionage Cases  
Overview: 
An important component of the project was obtaining a thorough understanding of the significant 
cases tried under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA).
37
 Since 1996, eight significant 
cases have been tried under the EEA. These eight cases include:  
 Dongfan “Greg” Chung  
 Lan Lee and Yuefei Ge  
 Anne Lockwood, Fuping Liu, and Michael Haehnel    
 Hong Meng 
 Xiaodong Sheldon Meng  
 Younggang “Gary” Min       
 Takashi Okamoto and Hiroaki Serizawa 
 Fei Ye and Ming Zhong                   
Based on low response rates to surveys conducted on trade secret and proprietary information 
loss,
38
 it was concluded that researching the key cases and then interviewing individuals 
associated with these cases would be the most effective way to obtain additional information.  
During a two-month period, case-related research was conducted and attempts were made to 
interview individuals associated with the cases. However, it was discovered that many court 
documents remain sealed and government and private sector individuals associated with the 
cases cannot participate in interviews. 
 
In regards to the companies, either the company representatives could not comment or the 
company would not accept the phone or written request for an interview. In regards to the 
District Attorney‟s office, some attorneys were able to discuss the generalities of economic 
espionage, but only after receiving permission from the Department of Justice. In regards to the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, protocol prevented 
representatives from discussing the cases. In regards to the defendants‟ attorneys, some were 
willing to discuss economic espionage and general details of the case.  
 
While interviews with individuals associated with these cases proved futile, the available open-
source material provides useful insight to the cases brought forth under the EEA. Additional 
information on these eight cases is available in the executive summaries listed below.  
  
                                               
37 The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA) criminalized the theft or misappropriation of trade secrets. Section 1831 
addresses the misappropriation of trade secrets, including the conspiracy to misappropriate trade secrets, with the intent to 
benefit a foreign entity.  Section 1832 addresses the misappropriation of trade secrets for a product shipped through interstate 
commerce and with the knowledge or intent to cause injury to the owner of the trade secret.  
38 The 2006 “Trends in Proprietary Information Loss” report produced by ASIS indicated a survey response rate of 10.3%. The 
2009 “CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey – Executive Summary” report produced by CSI indicated a survey response 
rate of 7.3%. 
ASIS 2007. “Trends in Proprietary Information Loss.” Survey Report, ASIS & National Counterintelligence Executive, p. 6, 
Sarah Peters.  "Executive Summary"  in 14th Annual CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey. Computer Security Institute. 
December 2009, p. 3. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: DONGFAN “GREG” CHUNG CASE 
 
Overview: 
FBI investigators discovered on March 29, 2007 that Dongfan “Greg” Chung (CHUNG) had 
accessed and stolen aerospace technology from The Boeing Company. CHUNG‟s name was 
found in documents linked to economic espionage at Boeing during a 2005 investigation of Chi 
Mak, an engineer at Power Paragon in Anaheim, CA.
39
  
 
In 1973, CHUNG began working for Boeing (formerly Rockwell International). In 2002, he 
retired from Boeing and became a contractor for the company.  During his tenure with Boeing, 
CHUNG held a „secret‟ level security clearance.40  
 
Beginning in 1979, CHUNG received assignments from Chinese aviation industry 
representatives.  In a letter dated May 2, 1987 from Gu Weihao, an official in the People‟s 
Republic of China‟s (PRC) Ministry of Aviation and the China Aviation Industry Corporation, 
CHUNG was instructed to visit China with his wife, who was an artist invited by the PRC to 
visit Chinese art institutions; to use Chi Mak as an intermediary to expedite and secure 
communications between CHUNG and the PRC; and to provide the PRC with data on Boeing‟s 
150-seat airplanes and shuttle orbiter. In a follow-up letter dated April 12, 1988, CHUNG was 
instructed to provide the PRC with information on „advanced technologies‟ and to target the U.S. 
aerospace industry. 
 
In response to these requests, CHUNG provided the PRC with information on the following 
technologies: The Delta IV Rocket (including three space shuttle flight stress analysis manuals 
from 1979); C-17 transport plane; B-1 bomber (24 manuals); and allegedly U.S. helicopters.
 41
  
 
Shortly thereafter, CHUNG began collecting manuals on aircraft fatigue: the F-100, the X-15, 
and the B-70.  In 1985, CHUNG, with ample knowledge of U.S. aerospace technology, traveled 
to China where he lectured on aircraft and space technology at government institutions, 
universities, and local aircraft manufacturing companies.   
 
During a 2006 search of his residence, authorities discovered 250,000-300,000 pages of 
information. Included in the discovery were data on the shuttle‟s phased-array system 
(communications technology), the Delta IV rocket and the C-17. The Delta IV technology is 
estimated to be valued between 17
42
 and 50
43
 million U.S. dollars (in terms of Boeing‟s R&D 
expenditures).  
                                               
39 Serrano, Richard A. and Reza, H.G. “O.C. Man Accused of Being a Spy.” Los Angeles Times. February 12, 2008.  
<http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/12/nation/na-espionage12/3>.  (accessed May 1, 2010). 
40 U.S. Department of Justice Press Release. “Former Boeing Engineer Charged with Economic Espionage in Theft of Space 
Shuttle Secrets for  China.” U.S. Department of Justice,  February 11, 2008.  
<http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/chungCharge.htm>. (accessed April 27, 2010). 
41 Flaccus, Gillian. “Engineer Pleads Not Guilty to Spy Charge.” Oakland Tribune. February 20, 2008. 
<http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2008/02/11/state/n183827S86.DTL>. (accessed February 11, 2008). 
42   ---- 2009. First economic espionage trial set in California for Chinese-born engineer Dongfan Chung N. pag. LA Times. 
(accessed May 31, 2009).  
 
43 ---- 2009. First US economic espionage trial winds down N. pag. AP Online.  
<http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5ioiyrNfUPsz4aaQl8lT1URmYuouQD991C7G82>. (accessed June 
24, 2009). 
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On July 16, 2009, CHUNG was convicted of economic espionage against Boeing and of acting 
as an agent of the PRC. On February 8, 2010, CHUNG was sentenced to over 15 years, or the 
equivalent of 188 months, in prison.
44
 
 
Timeline: 
 1973:     CHUNG began working for Rockwell International. 
 1979:     CHUNG is tasked by Chinese aviation officials to target  
 civilian aviation, military aviation, and shuttle data. 
 1979:      CHUNG sent three manuals related to Shuttle flight stress  
     analysis via sea freight (it is unknown if these manuals were  
     received). 
 1985-2003:     CHUNG traveled to China with the knowledge of  
     Rockwell/Boeing and lectured at universities and aircraft  
manufacturers on flight stress.  
 May 2, 1987:    CHUNG is instructed to use Chi Mak as an intermediary  
 April 12, 1988:    Chinese handlers explicitly request “advanced technologies.”  
 1996:      Boeing acquires Rockwell. CHUNG‟s office moves from  
     Downy, CA, to Huntington Beach, CA.  
 2002:      CHUNG retired from Boeing, but continues to work as a  
     contractor for the company.  
 2006:      CHUNG terminated contract work for Boeing.  
 March 29, 2007:    FBI arrested CHUNG, who is implicated during the Chi Mak  
     investigation.  
 July 16, 2009:   CHUNG is convicted of economic espionage on July 16, 2009 
     and of acting as an agent of China. 
 February 8, 2010:   CHUNG is sentenced to 188 months in prison.  
 
 
Company Overview: 
The Boeing Company 
 Boeing is divided into two sections: Boeing Commercial Airplanes and Boeing Defense, 
Space & Security. 
 Boeing is one of the largest U.S. exporters. 
 With employees from 70 countries, 57% of whom hold college degrees or higher, Boeing 
represents one of the most diverse, talented, and innovative workforces in the world.  
 The company has nearly 12,000 commercial jetliners in service worldwide, which is roughly 
75 percent of the world fleet. 
 Boeing designs, produces, modifies and supports fighters, bombers, transports, rotorcraft, 
aerial refuelers, missiles, munitions, and spacecraft for military and commercial use. 
 
                                               
44 U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Former Boeing Engineer Sentenced to Nearly 16 Years in Prison for Stealing Aerospace 
Secrets for China.” Department of Justice Press Release, February 8, 2010  
<http://losangeles.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/la020810.htm>. (accessed March 24, 2010). 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: LAN LEE AND YUEFEI GE CASE 
 
Overview: 
In 2006, Lan Lee (LEE) and Yuefei Ge (GE) were indicted for trade secret theft.
45
 On September 
26, 2007, they were indicted for violations to section 1831 and 1832 of the Economic Espionage 
Act (EEA).
46
 LEE and GE were accused of stealing 130 nanometer microchips
47
  and a software 
code
48
 from their employer NetLogic in San Jose, California during the period of 2002 to 2003.  
Additionally, they were charged with illegally downloading information from NetLogic 
computers.
49
 
 
LEE and GE established SICO Microsystems, Inc. in Delaware to develop and market products 
created from the stolen trade secrets. LEE and GE received $3.6 million in capital for SICO 
through China‟s 863 Program.50  Liu Baisen was identified as the venture capitalist for SICO.51 
The Beijing Electronic Development Company Limited also provided a portion of the capital.
52
 
 
In 2002, Lily Le, GE‟s wife, emailed NetLogic CEO Ron Jankov and called the FBI regarding 
her concerns about SICO Microsystems and LEE‟s and GE‟s activities.  53 In 2003, the FBI 
launched an investigation in which they discovered correspondences between LEE and GE and 
individuals in China.
 54
  LEE‟s computer also contained venture capital information. 55 
 
Additional evidence used in the LEE and GE case came from a plea bargain made with Fei Ye 
and Ming Zhong. In exchange for Ye‟s and Zhong‟s confession to requesting foreign funds, all 
charges were dropped against them.
 56
 The U.S. Attorney General‟s office believed that the LEE 
and GE case had more value than the YE and MING case.
57
 
 
                                               
45 Dan  Levine.  “Defense Blames Chinese Espionage Case on Neglected Wife.”  Law.Com.  October 22, 2009.   
 <http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202434866919>. (accessed April 27, 2010). 
46 U.S. Department of Justice.  “Two Bay Area Men Indicted on Charges of Economic Espionage.”  Department of     
  Justice Press Release.  September 26, 2007.  < http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/liIndict.htm>.  
 (accessed April 27, 2010). 
47 Josh Gerstein. “Spy Charges in High-Stakes Microchip Race.”  New York Sun.  June 19, 2006. 
    <http://www.economicespionage.com/NewYorkSun.htm>. (accessed April 27, 2010). 
48 Dan Levine.  “DOJ‟s Economic-Spy Strategy Emerges.” The Recorder.  May 5, 2008.  
< http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202421126406>. (accessed April 27, 2010).    
49 Ibid.  
50 U.S. Department of Justice.  “Two Bay Area Men Indicted on Charges of Economic Espionage.”  Department of   
 Justice Press Release.  September 26, 2007.  < http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/liIndict.htm>.  
 (accessed April 27, 2010). 
51 Jonathan Eric Lewis.  “The Economic Espionage Act and the Threat of Chinese Economic Espionage in the U.S.” University of 
Connecticut, School of Law. <http://jip.kentlaw.edu/art/volume%208/8%20Chi-Kent%20J%20Intell%20Prop%20189.pdf >. 
(accessed April 27, 2010). 
52 Josh Gerstein.  “Spy Charges in High-Stakes Microchip Race.”  New York Sun.  June 19, 2006. 
 <http://www.nysun.com/national/spy charges-in-high-stakes-microchip-race/34620/> (accessed April 27, 2010).  
53 Dan Levine.  “Rare Economic Espionage Case Filled with Quirks.”  Law.Com.  October 20, 2009.                                                         
 < http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202434787775>,  (accessed April 27, 2010). 
54 Howard Mintz.  “Silicon Valley Espionage Case Only Second of Kind in Nation to go to Trial.” San Mercury   
 News.  October 18, 2009.  <http://it.tmcnet.com/news/2009/10/19/4432100.htm>. (accessed April 30, 2010). 
55 Josh Gerstein. “Spy Charges in High-Stakes Microchip Race.”  New York Sun.  June 19, 2006. 
 <http://www.nysun.com/national/spy charges-in-high-stakes-microchip-race/34620/>. (accessed April 27, 2010). 
56 Dan Levine.  “DOJ‟s Economic-Spy Strategy Emerges.”  The Recorder.  May 5, 2008.  
 < http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202421126406> (accessed April 27, 2010). 
57 Ibid.  
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The LEE and GE case is the first case to be heard before a jury trial.
 58
 On November 20, 2009, 
LEE and GE were acquitted on two charges, but the jury was deadlocked on the other charges. 
LEE and GE remain eligible for retrial for the counts of conspiracy, economic espionage, and 
trade secret theft.
59
 If convicted under the EEA, the maximum penalty is 60 years with a $1.5 
million fine.
60
  If convicted for conspiracy, the maximum penalty is 15 years and $500,000 fine 
plus restitution, as applicable.
61
 If convicted, the maximum penalty for substantive counts is 10 
years and $250,000 fine plus restitution, as applicable and for each count.
62
 
 
Timeline: 
 2002-2003 LEE and GE stole a software code and 130 nanometer  
microchips code as well as illegally downloaded information 
from NetLogic computers 
 2002 NetLogic and FBI informed of LEE‟s and GE‟s activities 
 2003 FBI launched investigation 
 June 2006 First Indictment (Trade Secret Theft) 
 September 26, 2007 Second Indictment (Economic Espionage Act) 
 November 20, 2009 LEE and GE were acquitted on two charges and remain 
eligible for retrial on the counts of conspiracy, economic 
espionage, and trade secret theft 
 
Company Overview:  
NetLogic Microsystems, Inc.
 63
 
 NetLogic is the worldwide leader in intelligent semiconductor solutions that are used in 
Internet networks and differentiated network traffic tasks. 
 NetLogic‟s product portfolio includes high-performance Multi-Core Processors, Knowledge-
based Processors, Content Processors, Network Search Engines, Low-Power Embedded 
Processors and high-speed 10/40/100 Gigabit Ethernet PHY solutions. 
 Demand for NetLogic products is driven by the following: internet traffic, network security, 
convergence of voice, video and data traffic, proliferation of internet-connected devices, 
growth in data center and cloud computing deployments, adoption of IP 3G/4G mobile 
wireless infrastructure.   
 NetLogic has offices in the following locations: Mountain View, California (corporate 
headquarters); Cupertino, California; Austin, Texas; Raleigh, North Carolina; Canada; 
France; China, Korea, Japan, and India.  
                                               
58 Jordan Robertson.  “Rare Economic Espionage Case Going to Trail”.  USA Today.  October 21, 2009.  
 <http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2009-10-21-china-computer-espionage_N.htm>.   
 (accessed April 28, 2010). 
59  Jordan Robertson.  “Economic Espionage Case Ends in Jury Deadlock.”  USA Today.  November 24, 2009.   
 < http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2009-11-24-china-net-logic_N.htm>. (accessed April 27, 2010). 
60 Josh Gerstein. “Spy Charges in High-Stakes Microchip Race.”  New York Sun.  June 19, 2006. 
<http://www.nysun.com/national/spy charges-in-high-stakes-microchip-race/34620/>. (accessed April 27, 2010). 
61 Collen Taylor.  “Two Charged with Conspiracy to Commit Economic Espionage.”  Electronic News. September  
 27, 2007. <http://www.edn.com/article/CA6483922.html?text=> (accessed April 28, 2010). 
62 Ibid. 
63 “Company Profile.”  NetLogic Microsystems, <http://www.netlogicmicro.com/Company/Profile.htm>.  (accessed April 27, 
2010). 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: ANNE LOCKWOOD, FUPING LIU, AND  
MICHAEL HAEHNEL CASE 
 
Overview: 
Between February and December 2004, Anne Lockwood (LOCKWOOD), Fuping Liu (LIU), 
and Michael Haehnel (HAEHNEL), stole secret and proprietary information from Metaldyne, an 
international auto parts manufacturer, with the intention of assisting Metaldyne‟s Chinese 
competitors.  LOCKWOOD was a disgruntled employee who, after leaving her job as Vice 
President of sales at Metaldyne in early 2004, began collaborating with LIU.  LIU was a 
metallurgist for Metaldyne until April 2004, when he resigned and took a position at GKN Sinter 
Metals‟ Shanghai office. GKN Sinter Metals‟ headquarters are located in Michigan. 
LOCKWOOD and LIU jointly planned to steal Metaldyne‟s manufacturing process for the 
powdered metal connecting rod used in truck engines.  Metaldyne and GKN Sinter Metals, Inc. 
are the only two companies that have the ability to successfully produce heavy vehicle 
components from powdered metal.
64
 Additionally, LOCKWOOD‟s and LIU‟s activities targeted 
Metaldyne and GKN‟s internal business planning, GKN‟s business plans for China, cost and 
production information, and their internal cost structure for the connecting rods.
65
  To 
complement LIU‟s high-level access to Metaldyne‟s and GKN‟s trade secrets, LOCKWOOD 
recruited her husband, Michael Haehnel, a senior engineer at Metaldyne, to collect information 
on Metaldyne‟s manufacturing process.66  
Both LOCKWOOD and LIU passed the information obtained from their activities to GKN‟s 
Chinese competitor, Chongqing Huafu Industry Company, Ltd.
67
 LIU also provided GKN‟s 
information to another Chinese auto parts manufacturer, Liaoning Shuguang Automotive 
Corporation (SG Auto).  Frequent emails between LOCKWOOD and LIU and the two 
competitors eventually attracted attention and rumors, ultimately resulting in Metaldyne‟s 
decision to file a complaint with the FBI.
68
 
 
The FBI‟s Detroit office investigated this case, which resulted in the 2006 indictments of 
LOCKWOOD, LIU, and HAEHNEL on 64 counts. The primary count in the indictment was the 
conspiracy to steal confidential and proprietary information in order to assist a Chinese 
competitor.
69
  HAEHNEL was charged with one count of stealing confidential information 
valued at over $5,000 in a single-year period.  LIU was also charged with the same count as well 
as three separate counts of transporting stolen goods, mainly electronic files, each valued at over 
$5,000 in a single-year period.    
U.S. Attorney Terrence Berg, with Assistant U.S. Attorney Cynthia Oberg, prosecuted the case.  
On September 15, 2008, LOCKWOOD and LIU pleaded guilty to the main indictment count 
                                               
64 Megan Lampinen. "Former Metaldyne Employees Plead Guilty to Information Theft."  Automotive World  (2008). 
65 U.S. Department of Justice. “Former Metaldyne Employees Sentenced to Prison in Conspiracy to Steal  
Confidential Business Information to Benefit Chinese Competitor.” U.S. Department of Justice.  February 13, 2009. 
<http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/lockwoodSent2.pdf >. (accessed April 27, 2010). 
66 David J. Lynch. "FBI Goes on Offensive vs. Tech Spies." USA Today, July 24, 2007.  
<http://www.usatoday.com/money/world/2007-07-23-china-spy-2_N.htm>. (accessed May 2, 2010). 
67 Joseph M. Capus . "Theft of Metaldyne Connecting Rod Technology." Powder Metallurgy  48(1) (2005): 1-4. 
68 Richard Felton. “Caught Out!” Metal Powder Report 60(3) (2005): 3. 
69 U.S. Department of Justice. “Former Metaldyne Employees Sentenced to Prison in Conspiracy to Steal  
Confidential Business Information to Benefit Chinese Competitor.” U.S. Department of Justice.  February 13,  
2009. 
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while HAEHNEL pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor of illegally accessing stored electronic 
records.  LOCKWOOD received 30 months in prison with a two year supervised release and a 
$100 special assessment.  LIU was sentenced to 9 months in prison with a two year supervised 
release.  HAEHNEL received 18 months of probation with 6 months in prison and 6 months 
under house arrest. 
 
Timeline: 
 Early 2004 LOCKWOOD resigned as the Vice-President of Sales at  
  Metaldyne. 
 February-December 2004 The theft of Metaldyne property and information occurred. 
 April 2004 LIU resigned from Metaldyne and relocated to Shanghai to  
  work for GKN. 
 May 2004 LOCKWOOD and LIU repeatedly emailed Metaldyne  
 information to Huafu. 
 May 28-June 6 2004 LOCKWOOD and HAEHNEL traveled to China. 
 Oct. 27-Dec. 20 2004 LIU emailed GKN information to SG Auto. 
 June 2006 64 count indictment filed. 
 September 15, 2008 All three defendants pled guilty. 
 February 2009 All three defendants sentenced. 
      
Company Overview: 
Metaldyne 
 Metaldyne is a designer and manufacturer of automotive components that focuses on metal-
formed products for engine and transmission applications. 
 Metaldyne is a global company, and its clients include automakers such as Chrysler, Ford, 
BMW, Hyundai, GM, and Toyota, and parts suppliers such as Cummins, Delphi, and 
ArvinMeritor. 
 Metaldyne‟s leading global presence is a result of its focus on designing and supplying its 
own highly technical products, specifically in forging products and the Powder Metallurgy 
industry. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: HONG MENG CASE 
 
Overview: 
 
Hong Meng (H. MENG) was a senior research chemist for DuPont where he worked on OLED 
technology, which is technology for a new screen display for televisions and computer monitors. 
When H. MENG resigned from Dupont USA in 2009 to take a position with DuPont China in 
Shanghai, he did not inform DuPont that he also accepted a faculty position at the Peking 
University in Beijing in their College of Engineering‟s Department of Advanced Materials and 
Nanotechnology.  
 
During H. MENG‟s job transfer, he downloaded approximately 595 documents from his work 
computer to his personal external storage device.
70
  Of these documents, almost 550 of them 
were later found on MENG‟s personal computer.71  H. MENG intended to use these trade secrets 
to start a program at Peking University to commercialize OLED technology for industrial 
application.  However, DuPont officials, during a routine review of MENG‟s work computer, 
discovered MENG‟s activities prior to his transfer to Shanghai. Not only did they discover he 
downloaded confidential OLED documents, but also that he had accepted a faculty position at 
Peking University.
72
 
 
Although H. MENG was caught before he successfully implemented his plan, the damage level 
his activities caused remains unknown.  DuPont has filed a civil lawsuit seeking damages, but 
has not released a monetary amount.
73
 Federal authorities filed a criminal complaint in 2009, but 
the District Attorney‟s office has yet to issue an indictment74.  If indicted, the counts will include 
a maximum fine of $250,000, restitution, and a maximum prison sentence of five years.
75
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
70 Marc Reisch. "Chemist Charged With Crime." Chemical and Engineering News 87(41) (2009): 12-22. 
71 U.S. Department of Justice. “Former DuPont Chemist Charged: Dr Hong Meng Accused of Unauthorized  
Computer Access of OLED Technology.” October 2, 2009. <http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/mengChar.pdf>. 
(accessed April 27, 2010). 
72 O‟Sullivan, Sean. 2009. “DuPont charges industrial espionage Employee accused of plotting to take secret data to  
China.” The News Journal, 7, September 2009. 
73 Sean O‟Sullivan. “DuPont Charges Industrial Espionage Employee Accused of Plotting to Take Secret Data to  
China.” The News Journal, (2009):  
<http://www.mainefairtrade.org/pdf/DuPont%20charges%20industrial%20espionage.pdf>.  
(accessed April 27, 2010). 
74 Marc Reisch. "Chemist Charged With Crime." Chemical and Engineering News 87(41) (2009): 12-22. 
75 U.S. Department of Justice. “Former DuPont Chemist Charged: Dr Hong Meng Accused of Unauthorized  
Computer Access of OLED Technology.” October 2, 2009.  
<http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/mengChar.pdf>. (accessed April 27, 2010).   
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Timeline: 
 November 2002 MENG began employment with DuPont. 
 2007 MENG is promoted to senior research chemist and co-edited a  
  book on OLED.  
 Early 2009 MENG secretly accepted a position at Peking University. 
 August 18-19, 2009  DuPont security officials interviewed MENG after they search  
   his work computer. 
 August 23, 2009 MENG fired from DuPont. 
 Late August DuPont filed a civil suit against MENG. 
 October 2, 2009 MENG arrested and charged with a one-count criminal  
  complaint.  
 
Company Overview: 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company ("DuPont") 
 DuPont is a science and manufacturing company.  
 DuPont‟s inventions and manufacturing knowledge sustain the company‟s competitive 
advantage and represent a significant component of DuPont‟s market capitalization.  
 Each manufacturing plant requires significant investments, which are depreciated over many 
years.  
 DuPont‟s growth focus is in high-risk economies.  
 DuPont has strong collaboration with external entities. 
 
  
 Page 45 
 
XIAODONG SHELDON MENG CASE 
 
Overview: 
Between 2003 and 2004, Chinese native Xiaodong Sheldon Meng (MENG) violated the 
Economic Espionage Act (EEA). MENG was employed at Quantum 3D as a systems engineer, 
computer systems analyst, and 3D graphics application senior engineer.  Quantum 3D is a 
California-based provider of real-time visual simulation and computing systems for commercial 
and military consumption. When MENG changed employment in early 2004 from Quantum 3D 
to Orad, a Chinese competitor, he stole Quantum 3D‟s Mantis 1.5.5 program.  For the following 
year, MENG repeatedly attempted to sell this Quantum 3D property as an Orad product to the 
Chinese government.  MENG also used the Mantis program during Orad presentations and sales 
pitches to the Malaysian Air Force and the Thai Air Force.   
 
Additionally, MENG stole six segments of source code and at least 100 other software 
components from Quantum 3D.  However, Mantis 1.5.5 is classified as a defense article and 
cannot be exported without a U.S. export license.
76
 Mantis 1.5.5 is a military application trade 
secret used in military combat simulation software. Specifically, Mantis 1.5.5 military simulation 
programs employ viXsen and nVsensor, which are exclusively used in precision military training 
of fighter pilots, who use night vision and thermal equipment.
77
 Therefore, MENG not only 
violated EEA with his intent to benefit a foreign government, but also violated the U.S. Arms 
Export Control act by exporting classified defense articles listed on the U.S. Munitions List. 
 
Following a joint investigation by the U.S. Attorney‟s Computer Hacking and Intellectual 
Property (CHIP) Unit, FBI, DHS, and ICE produced a 36 count indictment. MENG pled guilty to 
violating the EEA and the Arms Export Control Act, both national security violations. He was 
sentenced by the Honorable Jeremy Fogel, U.S District Court Judge, to two years imprisonment 
and a fine of $10,000.
78
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
76 U.S. Department of Justice. “Former Chinese National Charged with Stealing Military Application Trade Secrets from Silicon 
Valley Firm to Benefit Governments of Thailand, Malaysia, and China.” U.S. Attorney Northern District of California.  
December 14, 2006.  <http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/mengCharge.htm>. (accessed April 27, 2010). 
77 Ibid. 
78 Jaikumar Vijayan. "Trial to Begin in Economic Espionage Case Involving China." Computerworld.  October 21,  2009. 
<http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/323000/trial_begin_economic_espionage_case_involving_china/>. (accessed April 
27, 2010). 
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Timeline:
79
 
 June 2000 - March 2003      MENG was employed with Quantum 3D.  
 March 26, 2003 MENG departed the U.S. for Taipei, Taiwan. 
 April - December 2003 MENG served as a consultant for Quantum 3D in Asia.  
 June 15, 2003 MENG attempted to sell the Malaysian Air Force with  
 Quantum 3D products. 
 August 17, 2003 MENG attempted to sell the Malaysian Air Force with  
 Quantum3D products.  
 January  2004 MENG accepted a position with Orad in China and resigned  
 as a consultant with Quantum 3D.  
 May - July 2004 MENG conducted a demonstration for Chinese government  
 agencies with stolen Quantum 3D.  
 July - August 2004 MENG provided a proposal to the Royal Thai Air Force  
 containing stolen Quantum 3D information.   
 September 2004 MENG provided additional demonstrations to the Chinese  
 Navy and Air Force. 
 Dec. 2004 - Jan. 2005  MENG deleted over 900 emails.  
 December 2006 MENG charged in 36 count indictment  
 August 1, 2007 MENG pled guilty. 
 June 18, 2008 MENG sentenced. 
 
 
Company Overview: 
Quantum 3D 
 Quantum 3D develops and manufactures real time visual computing hardware and software 
products. 
 Quantum 3D has development centers throughout the U.S. and sales and logistics operations 
in Europe. 
 Quantum 3D‟s clients include private companies such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, 
Raytheon, Rockwell Collins, and Ford Motors.  Quantum 3D also works on U.S. military 
projects such as the Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle, Bradley A3 Test Bed, and M1 Abrams 
Tank. 
 Quantum 3D competes in multiple industries, including Industrial & Military Computer 
Systems, Computer Hardware, Specialized Computer Systems, Semiconductors, and 
Graphics, Video Chips, and Boards. 
 The company‟s success depends on developing a strong client base and niche software 
products.  
 
  
                                               
79 U.S. Department of Justice. “Former Chinese National Charged with Stealing Military Application Trade Secrets from Silicon 
Valley Firm to Benefit Governments of Thailand, Malaysia, and China.” U.S. Attorney Northern District of California.  
December 14, 2006.  http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/mengCharge.htm (accessed April 27, 2010).  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: YOUNGGANG “GARY” MIN CASE 
 
Overview: 
Between August and December of 2005, Younggang “Gary” Min (MIN) accessed extremely 
high numbers of abstracts and full-text pdf documents from E.I. du Pont de Nemours and 
Company‟s (DuPont) Electronic Data Library (EDL). The EDL server accessed by MIN is one 
of Dupont‟s foremost databases for storing the company‟s trade secrets. MIN downloaded about 
22,000 abstracts from EDL and accessed over 16,000 documents. In total, MIN‟s downloads 
represented about 10 percent of information stored on the EDL server. His usage was more than 
15 times that of the next highest user during that period. In addition to his downloading 
activities, MIN also photographed sensitive DuPont notebooks. His EDL searches ranged from 
DuPont‟s most significant technologies and product lines to its latest technologies in the R&D 
stage. The market value of information accessed by MIN exceeded $400 million.
80
   
 
Upon raiding MIN‟s residence, authorities found DuPont documents on "numerous" computers. 
One had an external disk drive running a program to erase all of the data on it.
81
 An additional 
100 documents were found in a storage unit, and more documents were discovered in a one-room 
apartment rented by MIN.
82
  
 
According to the plea agreement, on November 13, 2006, MIN agreed to plead guilty in the 
United States District Court for the District of Delaware to Count I of Felony Information. Count 
I charges MIN with theft of trade secrets. The offense carries a maximum prison sentence of 10 
years, a fine of up to $250,000, and restitution. In accordance with the terms of his plea 
agreement, MIN pled guilty to misappropriating DuPont‟s trade secrets and agreed to cooperate 
with the government.
 83
 MIN was sentenced to 18 months in prison, and was ordered to pay US 
$14,500 in restitution and a US $30,000 fine.
84
 
 
This case was investigated by the FBI, Wilmington Resident Agency, and the United States 
Department of Commerce.  United States Attorney Colm F. Connolly and Assistant United 
States Attorney Robert F. Kravetz prosecuted the case.
85
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
80 The U.S. Department of Justice. “Guilty Plea in Trade Secrets Case.” United States Attorney’s Office District of Delaware. 
February 15, 2007. <http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/minPlea.pdf>.  
(accessed April 27, 2010). 
81 Jaikumar Vijayan. “DuPont Scientist Admits Downloading, Stealing $400M Worth of Trade Secrets.” Computerworld.  
February 15, 2007. <http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9011367>.  
(accessed April 27, 2010). 
82 The U.S. Department of Justice. “Guilty Plea in Trade Secrets Case.” United States Attorney’s Office District of Delaware. 
February 15, 2007. <http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/minPlea.pdf>.  
(accessed April 27, 2010). 
83 Ibid 
84 Chase, Randall. “Former Dupont Scientist Sentenced to 18 months in Prison for Stealing Company‟s Trade  
Secrets.” Associated Press. Nov. 6, 2007. <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21661606>. (accessed May 1, 2010). 
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Timeline:  
 November 1995   MIN began working for DuPont as a research chemist. 
 July 2005    MIN began discussions with DuPont competitor, Victrex  
     PLC, about possible employment opportunities in Asia.
1
 
 October 18, 2005   MIN signed a contract with Victrex (for January 2006 start  
     date). 
 December 12, 2005  MIN told DuPont about Victrex employment offer.  
 Aug. 2005 – Dec. 12, 2005 MIN accessed EDL and stole information.  
 February 2, 2006   MIN uploaded approximately180 DuPont documents,  
     including documents containing confidential trade secret  
     information to his Victrex-assigned laptop computer. 
 February 3, 2006   DuPont tells Victrex about the theft. 
 February 8, 2006   Victrex seized MIN‟s computer and turned it over to FBI. 
 February 14, 2006   FBI and Department of Commerce raided MIN‟s home in  
     Ohio. 
 November 13, 2006  MIN entered a guilty plea. 
 November 6, 2007   MIN sentenced. 
 
 
Company Overview:  
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company ("DuPont") 
 DuPont is a science and manufacturing company.  
 DuPont‟s inventions and manufacturing knowledge sustain the company‟s competitive 
advantage and represent a significant component of DuPont‟s market capitalization.  
 Each manufacturing plant requires significant investments, which are depreciated over many 
years.  
 DuPont‟s growth focus is in high-risk economies.  
 DuPont has strong collaboration with external entities. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: TAKASHI OKAMOTO AND HIROAKI SERIZAWA CASE 
 
Overview: 
From January 1997 to July 26, 1999, Takashi Okamoto (OKAMOTO) was employed by the 
Lerner Research Institute (LRI) of the Cleveland Clinic Foundation (CCF) to research causes and 
treatments for Alzheimer‟s Disease.86 The Alzheimer‟s research was funded under a $2 million 
research grant funded by the National Institute of Health.  
 
In April 1999, OKAMOTO was offered a position with the Brain Research Institute at the 
Institute of Physical and Chemical Research (RIKEN) in Japan.
87
 RIKEN is 94% funded by 
Japan‟s Ministry of Science and Technology.88   
 
On July 26, 1999, OKAMOTO resigned from LRI. He began working for RIKEN on August 3, 
1999.
 89
  Between July 8 through 12, 1999, OKAMOTO destroyed and stole Alzheimer‟s 
research from LRI that included: DNA, cell line regents, and other scientific materials.
90
 During 
the summer of 1999, OKAMOTO emailed colleagues at RIKEN to request storage space for 
research materials from LRI.
91
 
 
OKAMOTO returned to the U.S. in August 1999 to retrieve some of the stolen materials and to 
plant fake DNA test tubes at LRI, all with the assistance of a research colleague, Hiroaki 
Serizawa (SERIZAWA).
 92
 Although claiming ignorance to OKAMOTO‟s intent, SERIZAWA 
stored the stolen research materials in Kansas City, Kansas, and later transported said research to 
Japan where OKAMOTO was residing.
 93
  
 
An anonymous person within the LRI recorded phone conversations implicating OKAMOTO in 
the theft.
94
 Additionally, researchers at the LRI went to authorities after discovering missing 
research materials.
95
 
 
                                               
86 U.S. Department of Justice. “First Foreign Economic Espionage Indictment; Defendants Steal Trade Secrets from Cleveland 
Clinic Foundation.” United States Attorney Northern District of Ohio.  May 8, 2001. 
<http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/Okamoto_SerizawaIndict.htm>. (accessed April 27, 2010).   
87 Ibid.   
88 Ibid.   
89 Unknown. “DNA Plea-bargain Brings Probation.” The Daily Yomiuri.  May 30, 2003,  
<http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/homesubmitForm.do>. (accessed April 28, 2010). 
90 U.S. Department of Justice. “First Foreign Economic Espionage Indictment; Defendants Steal Trade Secrets from Cleveland 
Clinic Foundation.” United States Attorney Northern District of Ohio.  May 8, 2001. 
<http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/Okamoto_SerizawaIndict.htm>. (accessed April 27, 2010).   
91 Unknown. “Internal Report Suggests Gene Samples Lifted from U.S.”  The Nikkei Weekly.  June 11, 2001.  
<http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/homesubmitForm.do>.  (accessed April 28, 2010). 
92 U.S. Department of Justice. “First Foreign Economic Espionage Indictment; Defendants Steal Trade Secrets from Cleveland 
Clinic Foundation.” United States Attorney Northern District of Ohio.  May 8, 2001. 
<http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/Okamoto_SerizawaIndict.htm>. (accessed April 27, 2010).   
93 Justin Gillis. “Scientists Accused of Theft; Espionage Alleged Against Japanese.”  The Washington Post.  May 10,  
2001. < http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/homesubmitForm.do>. (accessed April 28, 2010). 
94 Unknown. “Scientist „Seen Taking Gene Samples‟”.  The Daily Yomiuri.  July 2, 2001.  
<http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/homesubmitForm.do>.  (accessed April 28, 2010). 
95 Ibid.  
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In May 2001, OKAMOTO and SERIZAWA were indicted on four criminal counts including: 
two violations under the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), interstate transport of stolen goods, 
and perjury.
 96
 The maximum penalty was a $500,000 fine and 15 years imprisonment.
 97
 
  
Two investigation teams, one from RIKEN and one from the Ministry of Education, Science, and 
Technology, investigated the research materials handled by OKAMOTO at RIKEN.
 98
 They 
concluded there was insufficient evidence linking the CCF‟s research materials to RIKEN.99  
In May 2002, SERIZAWA agreed to a plea bargain in which he admitted to perjury and agreed 
to testify against OKAMOTO in exchange for the EEA charges against him to be dropped.
 100
  
On May 28, 2003, SERIZAWA was sentenced to three years probation, a $500 fine, and 150 
hours of community service.
 101
  
 
In March 2002, the U.S. requested the extradition of OKAMOTO under the U.S.-Japan 
extradition treaty.
102
 In 2004, the Tokyo High Court rejected the extradition of OKAMOTO 
based on the lack of sufficient evidence under the EEA
103
 treaty‟s stipulation that the two 
countries share similar laws. Japan does not have an equivalent of the EEA.  
  
                                               
96U.S. Department of Justice. “First Foreign Economic Espionage Indictment; Defendants Steal Trade Secrets from  
Cleveland Clinic Foundation.” United States Attorney Northern District of Ohio.  May 8, 2001.  
<http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/Okamoto_SerizawaIndict.htm>. (accessed April 27, 2010).  
97 Ibid.   
98 Unknown. “Riken Plans In-house Probe.”  The Daily Yomiuri. May 11, 2001.  
<http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/homesubmitForm.do>. (accessed April 28, 2010). 
99 “Ibid. 
100 Unknown. “DNA Plea-bargain Brings Probation.” The Daily Yomiuri.  May 30, 2003. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Unknown. “Accused Doctor Sues Govt for 43 mil. Yen over Detention.”  The Daily Yomiuri. August 26, 2004. 
<http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/homesubmitForm.do>. (accessed  April 28, 2010). 
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Timeline: 
 Jan. 1997 – July 26, 1999 OKAMOTO employed by LRI. 
 April 1999 OKAMOTO offered a position with RIKEN. 
 July 26, 1999 OKAMOTO resigned from LRI. 
 August 3, 1999 OKAMOTO began working for RIKEN. 
 July 8-12, 1999 OKAMOTO stole and destroyed Alzheimer‟s research. 
 Summer 1999 OKAMOTO requested storage space at RIKEN for  
 Alzheimer‟s research. 
 August 1999 OKAMOTO returned to the U.S. to retrieve some Alzheimer‟s  
 research. 
 September 1999 SERIZAWA transported stolen research to OKAMOTO in  
 Japan. 
 May 2001 OKAMOTO and SERIZAWA were indicted on 4 criminal  
 counts. 
 March 2002 U.S. requested extradition of OKAMOTO. 
 May 2002 SERIZAWA agreed to plea bargain (plead guilty to perjury  
 and testify against OKAMOTO in exchange for EEA charges  
 to be dropped) 
 May 28, 2003 SERIZAWA sentenced to 3 years probation, $500 fine, and  
 150 hours of community service. 
 April 2004 Japan refused to extradite OKAMOTO. 
 
Company Overview:  
Lerner Research Institute, Cleveland Clinic Foundation
104
 
 LRI is the center for all of the CCF‟s laboratory, translational, and clinical research. 
 LRI‟s mission is to understand the causes of human diseases and to develop cures and 
treatments for such diseases. 
 In 2009, Cleveland Clinic was ranked as the fourth best hospital in the U.S. 
 There are over 200 biomedical researchers and 1,200 scientists and support staff at LRI. 
In 2008, LRI received an estimated $75 million from the National Institute of Health and its 
total research budget was $258 million. 
 In 2008, investigators submitted 62 invention disclosures to Cleveland Clinic Innovations, 
which resulted in 12 licenses, 22 patents, and three spin off companies. 
 
  
                                               
104 “About Us.”  Lerner Research Institute, Cleveland Clinic Foundation. <http://www.lerner.ccf.org/info/>. (accessed April 27, 
2010). 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: FEI YE AND MING ZHONG CASE 
 
Overview: 
On November 23, 2001, Fei Ye (YE) and Ming Zhong (ZHONG) were arrested at the San 
Francisco International Airport while attempting to board an aircraft bound for China with stolen 
trade secret information in their luggage. YE and ZHONG admitted to possessing stolen trade 
secrets from Sun Microsystems, Inc. and Transmeta Corporation. They also admitted their intent 
to utilize the trade secrets to design a computer microprocessor that would benefit the People‟s 
Republic of China and would be manufactured and marketed by Supervision, Inc., (a/k/a 
Hangzhou Zhongtian Microsystems Company Ltd., a/k/a Zhongtian Microsystems Corporation) 
a company established by YE and ZHONG in 2001.
105
  
 
There were a total of four companies victimized by the YE and ZHONG plot: NEC Electronics 
Corp., Sun Microsystems Inc., Transmeta Corp. and Trident Microsystems Inc. YE and ZHONG 
both worked at Transmeta and Trident. YE also worked at NEC and Sun.
106
 
 
In pleading guilty, YE and ZHONG admitted that any share of profits on chips sales would be 
given to the City of Hangzhou and the Province of Zhejiang in China because this city provided 
the capital to establish Supervision. YE and ZHONG further admitted applying for funding from 
the National High Technology Research and Development Program of China, commonly known 
as the "863 Program." Furthermore, papers seized from the men allegedly show their solicitation 
to the Chinese government for funding to assist with their startup costs and processes. According 
to prosecutors, the documents show YE and ZHONG marketed Supervision as a company that 
would elevate China's chip-making know-how and improve Chinese competition in the micro-
electronics market. However, it is unknown if YE and ZHONG were successful in obtaining any 
Chinese funding. Additionally, the indictments did not charge any representative of the Chinese 
government as a co-conspirator.
107
   
 
The YE and ZHONG case was the first conviction under the Foreign Espionage Act of 1996. YE 
and ZHONG were indicted by a federal grand jury on December 4, 2002. YE and ZHONG were 
charged with a total of ten counts, including: one count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
371, 1831(a)(5) and 1832(a)(5); two counts of economic espionage in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
1831(a)(3); five counts of possession of stolen trade secrets in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1832(a)(3); 
and two counts of foreign transportation of stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2314. The 
maximum statutory penalty for each count in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1831 is 15 years and a fine 
                                               
105 U.S. Department of Justice. “Two Men Plead Guilty to Stealing Trade Secrets from Silicon Valley Companies to Benefit 
China.” U.S. Attorney Northern District of California.  December 14, 2006. 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/yePlea.htm> (accessed April 27, 2010). 
106 U.S. Department of Justice. “Pair from Cupertino and San Jose, California, Indicted for Economic Espionage and Theft of 
Trade Secrets From Silicon Valley Companies.” U.S. Attorney Northern District of California.  December 4, 2002.  
<http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/yeIndict.htm>.  (accessed April 27, 2010). 
107 U.S. Department of Justice. “Pair from Cupertino and San Jose, California, Indicted for Economic Espionage and Theft of 
Trade Secrets From Silicon Valley Companies.” U.S. Attorney Northern District of California.  December 4, 2002. 
<http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/yeIndict.htm>. (accessed April 27, 2010). 
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of $500,000, plus restitution if appropriate. YE and ZHONG each pled guilty to two counts of 
economic espionage.
108
  
 
Kyle F. Waldinger and Richard C. Cheng, Assistant U.S. Attorneys in the Computer Hacking 
and Intellectual Property Unit, prosecuted the case, with the assistance of legal technicians Ponly 
Tu and Kathy Huynh. 
 
The government highly valued YE‟s and ZHONG‟s cooperation. While Assistant U.S. Attorney 
Kyle Waldinger calculated their prison sentences to extend beyond three years, the government 
recommended only 12 months in prison.  
 
Timeline: 
 2001     YE and ZHONG established Supervision, Inc.  
 November 23, 2001   YE and ZHONG arrested at San Francisco International  
      Airport. 
 November 23-24, 2001  Allegations are brought against YE for the possession at his  
residence of a feasibility report review regarding Hangzhou 
Zhongtian Microsystems Corporation at his house. The report 
suggested that the project receive the support of the Chinese 
government.  
 November 23, 2001  Allegations are brought against ZHONG for the possession at  
      his residence of a project application form for the National  
      Special Foundation for Importing Knowledge of Software and  
Integrated Circuits printed by the National Bureau of Foreign 
Experts. The application stated that the project is of 
tremendous significance to the Chinese integrated circuitry 
industry and should receive the support of the government.  
 December 4, 2002   Indictments filed on YE and ZHONG for 10 counts. 
 December 14, 2006   YE and ZHONG pled guilty. 
 November 21, 2008  YE and ZHONG are each sentenced to one year in prison.  
 
Company Overview:  
Sun Microsystems, Inc.  
 Founded on February 24, 1982.  
 A wholly owned subsidiary of Oracle Corporation, selling computers, computer components, 
computer software, and information technology services.  
 On January 27, 2010, Sun was acquired by Oracle Corporation.  
 
Transmeta Corporation 
 Founded in 1995, Transmeta was a former U.S.-based corporation that licensed low power 
semiconductor intellectual property.  
 Transmeta originally produced very long instruction word code morphing (micro-coded) 
                                               
108 U.S. Department of Justice. “Two Men Plead Guilty to Stealing Trade Secrets from Silicon Valley Companies to Benefit 
China.” U.S. Attorney Northern District of California.  December 14, 2006. 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/yePlea.htm>. (accessed April 27, 2010). 
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microprocessors, with a focus on reducing power consumption in electronic devices.  
 In January 2009, Transmeta was acquired by Novafora, which ceased operations in August 
2009. 
 
NEC Corporation 
 Japanese multinational IT company headquartered in Minato, Tokyo, Japan.  
 Provides information technology (IT) and network solutions to business enterprises, 
communications services providers and government. 
 Part of the Sumitomo Group109 
 
Trident Microsystems 
 Established in 1987. 
 Supplier of display-processors for flat panel displays (plasma, LCD, etc.).  
 A former supplier of PC graphics chipsets and sound controllers. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                               
109 A large keiretsu in Japan. 
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Omitted Variables 
Investor Confidence: 
The variable “Investor Confidence” can be defined as the level of risk and expected decrease in 
investment returns identified by an investor following an incident of economic espionage. 
Common investor confidence measures include the Barron‟s Confidence Index110 and the 
Standard and Poor‟s Confidence Indicator.111 Finance theorists explain that stock prices for 
publically traded firms represent the firm‟s fair value and can be used to measure the monetary 
impacts of economic espionage.
112
 The introduction of new information affecting stock prices is 
quickly reflected in stock price fluctuations.
113
 Therefore, finance theorists contend that the 
affects of a negative event, such as an act of economic espionage, can be measured through the 
difference between the expected earnings
114
 of a firm‟s stocks on a given day and the actual 
earnings of the firm‟s stocks on that same day.115 “Investor Confidence” is important to the 
consequence of economic espionage because incidents of economic espionage are likely to 
decrease investor confidence, which negatively impacts future investment and growth rates in 
U.S. industries. The variable “Investor Confidence” can be measured by examining the 
following: the amount of publicity, the length of resolution, and the quantity of company-
investor communication.  
 
The amount of publicity is defined as the information made public by the Department of Justice, 
the company, the defendant (defendant‟s spokesperson), or any other entity. The assumption is 
that an increased exposure to publicity causes the investor‟s perceived risk to increase. A higher 
perceived risk lowers overall investor confidence because it creates a negative and uncertain 
investment environment. The amount of publicity is measured by the number of news releases on 
the economic espionage incident produced by nationally accredited media sources. The amount 
of publicity can be measured by examining the following: the number of news releases on the 
economic espionage incident, the distribution of news releases by sources, and the frequency of 
news releases given major milestones in the case.   
 
                                               
110 Barron‟s Confidence Index is an indicator used to gauge investors' confidence based on how much investors are investing in a 
speculative grade of bonds. When investors are optimistic about the market, they tend to invest in high-quality bonds, but when 
they are worried about the market they invest in lower-quality bonds. This indicator is calculated by dividing the average yield on 
10 high-grade bonds by the average yield on 10 intermediate-grade bonds. The difference between the two is used to determine 
investors' confidence.  
InvestorWords. <http://www.investorwords.com/7494/Barrons_Confidence_Index.html>. (accessed April 17, 2010). 
111 Standard & Poor‟s Confidence Indicator is used in the securities markets and is calculated by constructing an index of low-
priced to high-grade common stock. A rising index indicates increased investor willingness to assume risk, which indicates 
increased investor confidence.  
The Free Dictionary <http://financial-dictionary.freedictionary.com/Standard+&+Poor‟s+500.>.  
(accessed April 17, 2010). 
112 Chris Carr and Larry Gorman. 2001. "The Re-Victimization of Companies by the Stock Market Who Report Trade Secret 
Theft under the Economic Espionage Act." The Business Lawyer 57(1). 
113 Ibid. 
114 The expected stock return on a specific day is determined through a statistical comparison between the historical  
values of pre-event stock returns and an established benchmark for returns, usually determined by Standard & 
Poor‟s 500 stock index. 
Chris Carr and Larry Gorman. 2001. "The Re-Victimization of Companies by the Stock Market Who Report Trade Secret Theft 
under the Economic Espionage Act." The Business Lawyer 57(1).2001.  “The Revictimization of Companies by the Stock Market 
who Report Trade Secret Theft Under the Economic Espionage Act.”  The Business Lawyer 57:1. 
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The length of resolution is defined as the amount of time between when the incident is made 
public by the Department of Justice and when the case is closed by the federal court system. The 
assumption is that a longer amount of time before a resolution is reached causes an investor‟s 
perceived risk to increase. A higher perceived risk lowers overall investor confidence because it 
increases the level of uncertainty for investors.  
 
The quantity of company-investor communication is defined as the company‟s ability to mitigate 
the incident by providing investors with symmetrical information on the economic espionage 
incident. The assumption is that the less information directly provided to investors by the 
company causes an investor‟s perceived risk to increase. A higher perceived risk lowers overall 
investor confidence because it decreases trust between investors and the company as well as 
increases the level of uncertainty for investors. The quantity of company-investor 
communication is measured by the frequency of communication, as related to the economic 
espionage incident, between the company and investors. The quantity of company-investor 
communication can be measured by examining the length of time between the company learning 
of the incident and informing investors of the incident and the number of formal communications 
(letters, memos, conference calls, emails, reports, and others) made by the company with 
investors. 
 
The inability to talk to private companies that are not traded on the stock market precluded the 
researchers from linking a decrease in investor confidence with an incident of economic 
espionage. The relationship is not provable, as it contains many immeasurable variables. 
 
Company Rationale: 
The variable “Company Rationale” can be defined as a company‟s decision to report an incident 
of economic espionage to the FBI. It is assumed that companies would be less inclined to notify 
the FBI of an incident of economic espionage because public knowledge of an incident is likely 
to harm investor confidence.  
 
Following a company becoming aware of an economic espionage incident, an in-house damage 
assessment of the theft is typically conducted.  During the damage assessment, the company will 
determine the probability of the incident leaking to the public without the company‟s consent.  If 
the theft becomes public without the company‟s consent, the firm could suffer a damaged 
reputation because it implies an attempted “cover-up” of the incident.  The damage to a 
company‟s reputation and subsequent consequence to the company‟s investor confidence will 
need to be weighed against the likelihood of the theft leaking to the public.  However, this 
relationship is not measurable because there are too many externalities to conclude the existence 
of a causal relationship between the variables.   
 
Additionally, an incident of economic espionage may be investigated by the FBI without the 
company‟s consent. An instance like this is likely to occur when the incident is reported to the 
FBI by a third party, or an individual who is neither an employee of the company nor the thief of 
the trade secret.      
 
Furthermore, a company‟s rationale differs depending on whether the company is publically 
traded or private. A publically traded company, or a company that is traded on the stock market, 
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is more sensitive to its public image because the public image influences levels of investment. 
Therefore, a public company would be more inclined to maintain the confidentiality of an 
incident of economic espionage.  On the other hand, a private company would be more likely to 
make the incident public. A private company, or one that is not traded on the stock market, has a 
smaller pool of investors.  Therefore, it is much easier for the company to inform investors of the 
incident. Both public and private companies may also desire restitution as a product of a civil 
trial, incentivizing the company to make the incident known.  
 
While the characteristics of the company are important, the frequency of incidents of economic 
espionage will be more influential in a company‟s decision to inform FBI. It can be assumed that 
a company‟s decision to declare a theft would demonstrate the severity of an incident, and the 
associated publicity of the incident would deter future thefts. Past experiences with incidents of 
economic espionage may make it more difficult for a company to maintain the confidentiality of 
the incident. Also, it could be necessary for the company to improve security measures and 
prevent similar incidents from occurring by allowing a federal investigation and prosecution of 
the incident, or by consulting with a private security company.  
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User Interface Manual 
Produced by the Bush School, Texas A&M University for use by CENTRA Technology 
 
Introduction: 
This model calculates the economic consequence of espionage based upon four key variables, 
which indicate the magnitude of loss. These four key variables include: the industry in which the 
theft occurred, the characteristics of the theft, the cost, and the characteristics of the beneficiary 
country. 
 
Overview of Variables: 
(1) Industry 
The „Industry‟ variable consists of measurements that represent 14 sectors of the U.S. 
economy, excluding the government and public sector. Depending upon the nature of the 
company targeted and the specifics of the espionage incident, several economic sectors may 
be impacted. However, the user of this model should indicate the single industry that would 
receive the greatest impact from the incident.  
 
(2)  Characteristics of the Theft 
The „Characteristics of the Theft‟ variable is a conclusive measure of the scope of the attack, 
the network impact, and the placement of the thief/thieves. The Characteristics of the Theft 
identify key factors that influenced the impact of the theft on the company including scope of 
attack, network impact, and placement of the thief/thieves.   
 
(3) Cost 
The „Cost‟ variable includes measurements that consider the resources and monetary 
commitment the company previously invested into the stolen material. This variable also 
considers factors that could improve or worsen the direct costs of the espionage incident. The 
Cost variable is measured by examining stage of production, time spent in R&D, complete 
loss, product produced under high security, and restitution paid. 
 
(4) Beneficiary 
The „Beneficiary‟ variable includes measurements that consider the foreign entity, the  
destination of the stolen materials, and the impact the beneficiary has on the overall costs of 
the incident. Using values from independent sources and country characteristics, an estimate 
of a country‟s production potential is produced. This category recognizes that certain 
countries, regardless of the value of the stolen material they may acquire, are incapable of 
utilizing certain materials in a way that would compete with the U.S. economy.  
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User Manual Instructions: 
Scale for Assigning Values 
The process of assigning values consists of the user identifying the key industry affected by the 
incident and then assigning values to each of the subset variables applicable to the given case. A 
value of unknown/non-applicable, 0, 1, 2, or 3 should be assigned to each applicable variable 
within the subset. Irrelevant or indeterminate variables within the subset should be assigned a 
value of 0. Unknown or non-applicable should be assigned to variables where the information is 
either unknown or non-applicable to the case. The valuation of the scale should be based upon 
the following criteria:  
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1. Agriculture: 
Farms and Forestry, fishing, hunting, and related activities. 
2.  Mining: 
Oil and gas extraction, Mining (except oil and gas), and Support activities for mining 
3. Utilities: 
4. Construction: 
5. Manufacturing: (divided into two sections: Durable and Nondurable Goods) 
A. Durable Goods: 
Wood products, Nonmetallic mineral products; Primary metals; Fabricated metal products;  
Machinery; Computer and electronic products; Electrical equipment; appliances and  
components; Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts; Other transportation equipment;  
Furniture and related products; and Miscellaneous manufacturing 
B. Nondurable Goods: 
Food and beverage and tobacco products; Textile mills and textile product mills; Apparel and  
leather and allied products; Paper products; Printing and related support activities; Petroleum  
and coal products; Chemical products; Plastics and rubber products 
6. Wholesale Trade: 
7. Retail Trade: 
8. Transportation and Warehousing: 
Air transportation; Rail transportation; Water transportation; Truck transportation; Transit and  
ground passenger transportation; Pipeline transportation; Other transportation and support  
activities; Warehousing and storage 
9.  Information: 
Publishing industries (includes software); Motion picture and sound recording industries;  
Broadcasting and telecommunications; Information and data processing services 
10. Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, Rental, and Leasing: 
A. Finance and insurance: 
Federal Reserve banks, credit intermediation, and related activities; Securities, commodity  
contracts, and investments; Insurance carriers and related activities; Funds, trusts, and other  
financial vehicles 
B. Real estate and rental and leasing: 
Real estate; Rental and leasing services and lenders of intangible assets 
11. Professional and Business Services: 
A. Professional, scientific, and technical services: 
Legal services; Computer systems design and related services; Miscellaneous professional,  
scientific, and technical services 
B. Management of companies and enterprises. 
C. Administrative and waste management services: 
Administrative and support services; Waste management and remediation services 
12. Educational services, health care, and social assistance: 
A. Health care and social assistance, Includes: 
Ambulatory health care services; Hospitals and nursing and residential care facilities; Social  
assistance 
13. Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services: 
A. Arts, entertainment, and recreation: 
Performing arts, spectator sports, museums, and related activities; Amusements, gambling, and  
recreation industries 
B. Accommodation and food services: 
Accommodation; Food services and drinking places 
14.  Other Services: (except government) 
(1) Industry  
Select the industry affected by the espionage incident.  In the event that several industries 
were affected, select the industry which suffered the greatest economic loss. 
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(2) Characteristics of the Theft 
Rank the following factors‟ relevance to the incident of economic espionage. 
 
Scope of the theft? 
Scope can be defined as the range of impact the theft had on the firm in terms of tangible and 
intangible damages. 
 
- The scope of the theft is unknown or not applicable. 
0. There was an attempted theft, which was unsuccessful. 
1. There was a theft, which had limited targeting. The theft may have caused minimal 
damage. 
2. The theft targeted a moderate level of information. The theft may have caused significant 
damage to the company. 
3. The theft targeted a large quantity of information. The degree of compromise may be 
catastrophic. 
 
Information Network impact? 
Information Network impact can be defined as any theft in which a company‟s server 
and/or electronic network system is affected. 
 
- The level of information network impact is unknown or not applicable. 
0. The theft did not impact the information network. 
1. The theft had a minimal impact on the information network. Other users were either 
unaffected or only minimally inconvenienced. 
2. The theft had a moderate level of impact. A larger number of users may be affected and 
repair costs may be significant. 
3. The theft had a high level of impact. The information network was severely damaged, 
affecting a large number of users and repair costs were extremely high.  
 
Placement of the Thief/Thieves? 
Placement of the Thief/Thieves can be defined as an internal actor, external actor, or both 
internal and external. An internal actor is an individual who is employed by the company. An 
external actor is a non-employee of the company. A combination of both an internal and 
external actor includes at least one individual who is an employee of the company and at 
least one individual who is a non-employee of the company.    
 
1. The placement of the thief/thieves constitutes an external actor.  
2. The placement of the thief/thieves constitutes an internal actor. 
3. The placement of the thieves constitutes a combination of an internal actor(s) and an 
external actor(s). 
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(3) Cost 
Rank the following factors relevance to the incident of economic espionage. 
 
Stage of Production. 
Stage of Production can be defined by the three key stages: planning, R&D, and production, 
under which a product is developed. The planning stage allows a small and controlled group 
of employees and researches to formulate ideas and plans. The R&D stage consists of the 
research and development of a product or information. The production phase is the 
manufacturing of a product or information. 
- The specific stage of production is unknown or not applicable. 
1. The process/product was stolen during the planning stage. 
2. The process/product was stolen during the research and development stage. 
3.  The process/product was stolen during the finalized production stage. 
 
Time Spent in Research and Development (R&D)? 
Time Spent in R&D can be defined as the amount of time a product or information spent in 
the research and development stage of production. It is reasonable to assume a positive 
correlation between the length of time a product is in the R&D stage and the overall 
production costs.  
- Time spent in R&D is unknown or not applicable 
0. There was no time spent in R&D. 
1. The time spent in R&D is less than 1 year. 
2. The time spent in R&D is between 1 and 10 years. 
3. The time spent in R&D is more than 10 years. 
 
Complete Loss?     
Complete Loss can be defined as the amount of the product stolen from the company. A 
Complete Loss is an incident of economic espionage where the total or majority of the 
product or information is stolen, irretrievable, and used by the beneficiary. A Minor Loss 
can be defined as an incident of economic espionage in which the product or information 
stolen or compromised is insufficient to allow a beneficiary to reproduce the production or as 
an incident where the product or information stolen is returned to the company.  
- The amount of loss is unknown or not applicable. 
0. There was no loss.  
1. A negligible portion of the product was stolen and/or the amount stolen is inadequate for 
the product to be reproduced by a competitor.  Or, the majority of the product was 
recovered. 
2. A partial amount of the product was stolen and/or the production cannot be quickly 
reproduced by a competitor.  Or, a partial amount of the product was recovered. 
3. A significant majority or the entirety of the product was stolen.  The amount stolen is so 
great that a competitor will be able to reproduce the product quickly. 
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Product Under High Security? 
High Security can be defined as enhanced security measures implemented by the company 
during the stages of production to protect the value of the product or information.  
- It is unknown if the product was produced under high security or not applicable. 
0. The product was not under security during its development process. 
1. The product had low security during its development process. 
2. The product had moderate security during its development process. 
3. The product had high security during its development process. 
 
Restitution Paid? 
Restitution Paid can be defined as any amount of payment the company receives from the 
thief/thieves or beneficiary. „Restitution‟ assesses the total cost incurred by a company by 
subtracting the restitution payment from the overall loss the company experienced from the 
incident.   
- It is unknown if restitution was paid or not applicable 
1. A high restitution was paid. 
2. A moderate restitution was paid. 
3. Little restitution was paid. 
 
(4) Intended Beneficiary 
Please select the name of the country (or countries) that benefitted or were intended to 
benefit from the theft.   
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